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The relation between spatial vision and spatial language has always been a 
source of controversy. Three problems can be identified as in need of a 
solution. A first problem pertains to the nature of the minimal information 
units that make up spatial vision and language. A second problem pertains 
to the ‘dynamic’ aspects of vision and language, or what visual information 
to and similar adpositions correspond to. A third problem pertains to how 
these different types of information are related one another, and what is the 
status of this ‘interface’, especially within a broader theory of language and 
cognition. The solution proposed here consists in a formal (model-theoretic) 
treatment of visual and linguistic information, both static and dynamic, that 
is couched within (a simplified form of) Discourse Representation Theory. It is 
shown that this solution is consistent with general theories of cognition and 
may shed some (novel) light on the nature of the FLN/FLB distinction.  
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1. Introduction: What We Talk about, When We talk about Space 
 
In this paper, I shall address the problem of the vision–language interface: 
Informally, what is the exact relation between ‘what we see’ and ‘what we say’, 
(or: “How much space gets into language?”; Bierwisch 1996: 7). This problem can 
be formulated via the following (and slightly different) global research question:  
 
Q–A: What is the relation between vision and language? 
 
I shall suggest that the problem of the vision–language interface and its nature is 
                                                       
  I wish to thank Stephen Crain, Max Coltheart, Drew Khlentzos, and Rosalind Thornton for 
reading and making comments on an initial draft, Qiu-Peng (Autuman) Luo and Miaoling 
(Anne) Hsieh for thorough feedback on later drafts, the editors of Biolinguistics for extensive 
support during the editorial process, and two anonymous reviewers for their very useful 
and stimulating comments, which I hope to have addressed in detail. I wish to thank the 
captains Harlock and Kirk as long-time role models, and my Princess for all her love and 
support. All remaining errors are of course my own; for those, I apologize to the reader.  
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not much a problem of ‘quantity’ but ‘quality’: In order to solve this problem, we 
need to address not ‘how much’ information belonging to spatial representations 
(“what we see”) finds its way in language (and vice versa), but ‘how’ this process 
comes by and how it is possible that visual information can be realized in 
language in a rather flexible way. I shall argue that in order to understand how 
sentences such as (1) and (2) can convey non-linguistic spatial information, we 
need to understand how the relation between “what we see” and “what we say” 
comes about in the first place. 
 
(1) Mario sits in front of the chimney. 
(2) Mario has gone to the rugby match. 
 
 This problem can be solved by a divide et impera research strategy. I shall 
first split the problem in three smaller problems (the divide part), and solve each 
of them, integrating these solutions in a ‘global’ solution (the impera part). The 
three problems that constitute our central problem are the following.  
 First, we have a foundational problem, since previous proposals in the 
literature make different assumptions on the nature of “what we see’” and “what 
we say”. Some assume that language expresses only shapes of objects (as nouns) 
and geometrical configurations (as adpositions) (e.g., Landau & Jackendoff 1993); 
others that we directly express perceptual information “as we see it”, without an 
intermediate level of processing (i.e. language, e.g., Coventry & Garrod 2004). 
Hence, we don’t have a clear (theoretical) picture regarding spatial vision and 
spatial language, and to what extent they are distinct modules of cognition, let 
alone a strong, clear theory of their interface. 
 Second, we have a descriptive and logical problem, since previous proposals 
only cover inherently “static” aspects of space, but not “dynamic” aspects. Infor-
mally, these theories can account where things are, but not where things are going. 
Hence, we do not know what visual information adpositions such as to and from 
stand for, nor whether this information should be considered as “spatial’” or not. 
 Third, we have a theoretical and a philosophical problem, since we must 
define a novel theory that is built upon the solutions to the first and second 
problem and can explain all the data. Then we must assess the consequences of 
this theory with respect to a broader theory of vision and language as part of cog-
nition, and their unique aspects — or: What information (and properties thereof) 
is found in vision but not in language, and vice versa. 
 These three ‘smaller’ problems can be reformulated as the following re-
search questions: 
 
RQ1: What do we know so far from the past literature, regarding spatial vision, language 
and their interface? 
RQ2: What further bits of spatial knowledge must be included in our models of (spatial) 
vision and language, and which formal tools used to properly treat these bits? 
RQ3: What is the nature of the vision–language interface, and which aspects are unique 
to language? 
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Anticipating matters a bit, I shall propose the following answers. First, we know 
that previous literature tells us that (spatial) vision and language express internal 
models of objects and their possible spatial relations, and that nouns and adpo-
sitions respectively represent objects and possible relations in language. Second, 
we must include any type of relations in our models of vision and language, inso-
far as they allow establishing a relation between entities, since the emergent no-
tion of ‘space’ we will obtain from our discussion is quite an abstract one. Hence, 
we can use a model-theoretic approach, such as Discourse Representation Theory 
(DRT; Kamp et al. 2005), to aptly represent these models. Third, the vision–
language interface consists of the conscious processes by which we may match 
visual representations with linguistic ones and vice versa, though some linguistic 
representations do not represent visual objects, rather ‘processes’ by which we 
may reason about these visual objects. Consequently, vision and language can be 
represented as distinct models sharing the same ‘logical structure’, which may be 
connected or ‘interfaced’ via an opportune set of functions, representing top-
down processes by which we may (consciously) evaluate whether what we see 
accurately describes what we say (or hear), but need not to do so. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce some basic 
notions and review previous proposals, offering an answer to the first research 
question. In section 3, I review theories of ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ object recog-
nition, and propose a model-theoretic approach to vision; I then focus on lang-
uage and offer a DRT treatment of spatial language. In section 4, I integrate the 
two proposals in a novel theory of the vision–language interface and offer empi-
rical evidence in support of this theory; I then focus on some of the broader con-
squences of the theory, by sketching an analysis of what properties emerge as 
unique to language from my theory, thus suggesting a somewhat novel pers-
pective to the nature of the narrow faculty of language (FLN; Hauser et al. 2002, 
Fitch et al. 2005). In section 5, I finally offer my conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Relation between Spatial Vision and Language 
 
In this section I shall outline notions of spatial vision and language (section 2.1) 
and review previous approaches to their interface, consequently offering the first 
research answer (section 2.2). 
 
2.1. Basic Notions of Space 
 
Our daily life experiences occur in space and time,1 as we navigate our environ-
ment by analyzing spatial relations between objects. A basic assumption, in cog-
nitive science, is that we do so by processing (mostly) visual information about 
such objects and their relations as they may evolve over time, e.g., a toy which is 
                                                       
    1 Here and throughout the paper, I shall focus my attention (and use of labels) to ‘space’, 
although it would be more accurate to think of our topic as being about spatio-temporal 
vision and language, i.e. how we process location and change of location of objects. I hope 
that the lack of precision will not confuse the reader, and thank an anonymous reader for 
suggesting this precís. 
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on top of a table, and that we internally represent this information via a corres-
ponding mental ‘model’ (e.g., Craik 1943, Johnson-Laird 1983, 1992, O’Keefe & 
Nadel 1978).  
 Another basic assumption is that, when we share this information with 
other fellow human beings (i.e. when we speak), we do so by defining a sub-
model of space in which one object acts as the ‘center’ of the system, as in (3): 
 
(3) The toy is on top of the table. 
 
With a sentence such as (3), we convey a state of affairs in which, informally, we 
take the table as the origin of the reference system, take one portion of the table 
(its top) and assert for the toy to be more or less located in this ‘area’ (Talmy 1978, 
2000). Our cognition of space is thus (mostly) based on the information processed 
and exchanged between our vision2 module (“what we see”) and our language 
module (“what we say”). It is also based on an emerging type of information, the 
structural relations that may be defined between these two modules, our ability 
to integrate together visual and linguistic units (“what we see and what we say”) 
into coherent representations, over time. 
 The exact nature of these types of information, however, is a matter of 
controversy. Some say that spatial vision amounts to information about objects, 
their parts and shape, and the geometrical relations between these objects as 
when an object is on top of another (e.g., Landau & Jackendoff 1993, O’Keefe 
2003). Another series of proposals offers evidence that other aspects, such as 
mechanical interactions (a table supporting a toy) and more abstract properties 
play a crucial role in how we mentally represent space (Coventry & Garrod 2004 
and references therein).  
 We can thus observe that there is a certain tension between ‘narrower’, or 
purely geometrical, approaches and ‘broader’ approaches to both vision and 
language; as a consequence, there is also a certain tension between theories that 
consider spatial vision ‘richer’ than spatial language (e.g., Landau & Jackendoff 
1993), and theories that do not assume such difference, often by simply 
collapsing these two modules into ‘cognition’ (e.g., Coventry & Garrod 2004). We 
thus do not have a clear picture of what information is spatial language, and 
what is spatial vision. 
 The problem of the exact type of spatial information, however, takes an 
even more complex nature when we look at another way in which we process 
spatial information, which can be loosely labeled as ‘change’. Take a sentence 
such as (4): 
 
(4) Mario is going to the rugby stadium. 
 
Intuitively, this sentence describes a state of affairs in which the locatum(s) 
changes position over a certain amount of time of which we are aware. Mario can 
                                                       
    2 The notion of spatial vision and cognition are somewhat interchangeable for most authors. 
In this paper I shall use the term ‘spatial vision’ and ‘spatial language’ to avoid this con-
fusion. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing me to this issue. 
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start at some unspecified starting point, move for a while, and then stop once 
he’s at his planned destination (the rugby stadium). While there are theories of 
‘dynamic’ vision, or how we keep track of objects changing position, as well as 
theories of ‘dynamic’ language and more specifically adpositions such as to, no 
one has attempted to integrate these theories into a broader theory of spatial 
vision and language, let alone in a theory of the vision–language interface.  
 Another challenge comes from purely linguistic facts, and what kind of 
information is in a sense ‘unique’ to a linguistic level of representation. Take a 
sentence such as (5): 
 
(5) Every boy is going to a rugby field. 
 
In this case, we can have a certain number of boys involved in the corresponding 
state of affairs, and each of them is described as moving in direction of a rugby 
field. Yet, if there are several fields at which the children can arrive (Paul goes to 
Manly’s Oval, Joe to Randwick Field, etc.), the sentence may describe slightly 
different states of affairs, since they informally describe a ‘collection’ of more 
specific relations, and what they have in common. As these facts show, we need 
to take a broader and more flexible perspective in order to address the issue of 
the vision–language interface than the one usually assumed in the literature, as 
well as assessing in detail what elements of previous proposals we can maintain 
in our novel approach. Hence, I am also suggesting that the solution to this prob-
lem will offer us a quite different, but hopefully correct, answer to the ‘problem 
of space’. Before offering this answer, however, I shall review the previous liter-
ature. 
 
2.2. Previous Literature 
 
Previous proposals on the vision–language interface can be divided into a ‘nar-
rower’, geometric approach (or: “spatial language expresses geometric relations”) 
and ‘broader’, ‘functional’ approach (or: “spatial language also expresses extra-
geometrical relations”). One well-known and influential example of the geo-
metric approach is Landau & Jackendoff (1993, henceforth L&J), while a well-
known and influential functional approach is the Functional Geometric Framework 
(FGF; Coventry & Garrod 2004). I will offer a review of both, highlighting their 
features and shortcomings, with respect to the topic of this chapter, starting from 
L&J’s proposal.  
 L&J offer evidence that, at a visual level, objects and their relations are 
captured using “spatial representations”, chiefly expressed by adpositions. Size, 
orientation, curvature and other physical properties all conspire for an object to 
be recognized as more than a sum of its parts: a ‘whole’ entity, or what the object 
is. Whole objects or ‘whats’ can also be related one to another: If we have two 
objects, one will be conceived as a landmark object (or ground), while the other 
will be the ‘located’ entity (or figure; Talmy 1978, 2000). 
 They also argue that the rich and variegated layers of visual-cognitive 
information are processed and then clustered together and associated with ‘con-
ceptual labels’ (or just ‘concepts’) and hierarchically organized within the 
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Conceptual System (CS, Jackendoff 1983, 1990, 1991, 2002), the interface between 
non-linguistic modules and (linguistic) domain of semantics. This proposal and 
further extensions assumes that nouns are the main category representing objects 
in language, whereas adpositions represent spatial representations/relations (e.g., 
van der Zee 2000). In line with other literature, L&J propose that spatial expres-
sions mostly involve ‘count’ nouns, which can be seen as labels for objects with a 
given ‘shape’ (e.g., ‘cylinder’ or the fictional ‘dax’: Carey 1992, 1994, 2001, Soja et 
al. 1992, Bloom 2000, Carey & Xu 2001). Adpositions, on the other hand, are 
argued to express core geometrical properties such as overlapping, distance and 
orientation (e.g., in, in front of; Landau & Stecker 1990, Landau et al. 1992).  
 Recent inter-disciplinary research has shown that the picture is somewhat 
more complex. A rich body of evidence has been accumulated suggesting that 
adpositions can also convey information which is not necessarily geometric in 
nature. Look at the examples: 
 
(6) The book is on the table. 
(7) Mario is beside the table. 
(8)    #The table is beside Mario. 
(9) Mario is taking the moka machine to the kitchen. 
 
If a book is “on” the table (as conveyed by (6)), the table will also act as a mecha-
nical support to the book, that is, it will prevent the book from falling. We can say 
that Mario is “beside” the table (as in (7)), but saying that the table is beside 
Mario will be pragmatically odd (as in (8)):3 Figures tend to be animate entities 
(or at least conceived as such), whereas grounds tend to be inanimate entities.   
 These mechanical properties can also be seen as extra-linguistic or ‘spatial’ 
properties associated to nouns. Informally, if a count noun such as book is asso-
ciated to an object with definite shape, it can (and should) be involved in causal 
physic relations (e.g., support, or containment); cf. Kim & Spelke (1992, 1999), 
Spelke & van der Walle (1993), Spelke et al. (1994), van der Walle & Spelke (1996), 
Spelke & Hespos (2001), Smith et al. (2002), Shutts & Spelke (2004). 
 Dynamic contexts offer similar evidence for the relevance of extra-
geometric information to be relevant. For instance, in a scenario corresponding to 
(9), we will understand that the Moka machine4 brought to the kitchen by Mario 
will reach the kitchen because of Mario’s action (Ullman 1979, 1996, von Hofsten 
et al. 1998, 2000, Scholl 2001, 2007). We will also take for granted that the 
machine’s handle and beak will reach the kitchen as well, as parts of the machine, 
unless some problem arises in the meanwhile. If Mario trips and the Moka 
machine falls mid-way to the kitchen, breaking in many pieces, we may not be 
able to recognize the Moka machine as such (Keil 1989, Smith et al. 1996, Landau 
et al. 1998). Spatial relations, and thus adpositions that express these relations, 
can implicitly capture the (potential) causal relations or affordances between dif-
                                                       
    3 Examples (7) and (8) and related discussion are based on an issue correctly pointed out by 
an anonymous reviewer, whom I thank. 
    4 The traditional Italian machine for espresso coffee. 
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ferent objects (e.g., Landau 1994, 2002. Munnich & Landau 2003).  
 For these reasons, Coventry & Garrod (2004) propose their FGF framework, 
according to which mechanical, geometrical and affordance-oriented properties 
form the mental model or schema (in the sense of Johnson-Laird 1983) of adposi-
tions that we store in long-term memory. This model can be seen as the ‘complete’ 
representation of an adposition’s meaning, which can then only partially corres-
pond to its actual instantiation in an extra-linguistic context (see also Herskovits 
1986).  
 According to this theory, speakers can then judge a sentence including a 
spatial adposition more or less appropriate or felicitous, depending on whether 
the adposition’s content is fully or partially instantiated in an extra linguistic 
scenario (e.g., van der Zee & Slack 2003, Coventry & Garrod 2004, 2005, Carlson 
& van der Zee 2005, Coventry et al. 2009, Mix et al. 2010). Two examples are the 
following: 
 
(10) The painting is on the wall. 
(11) The painting is in the wall. 
 
A sentence such as (10) can be considered more appropriate than (11) when used 
in an extra-linguistic context in which a certain painting is just hanging on the 
wall, but less appropriate when the painting is literally encased in the wall’s 
structure. 
 Other theories take a perspective which is either close to L&J or FGF. Vector 
Grammar Theory (O’Keefe 1996, 2003) treats English adpositions as conveying 
information about vector fields, the graded sequence of vectors representing the 
minimal ‘path’ from ground to figure, and thus conveying purely geometric 
information. Another theory which is based on similar assumptions is the 
Attentional Vector Sum model (AVS; Regier & Carlson 2001, Regier & Zheng 2003, 
Carlson et al. 2003, 2006, Regier et al. 2005). In this theory, ‘vectors’ represent 
features of objects that can attract the speaker’s attention once he interprets a 
spatial sentence, and can thus include mechanical and functional aspects as well 
as environmental (‘reference frames’) information.  
 These theories thus predict that a sentence such as (12), 
 
(12) The lamp is above the chair. 
 
is interpreted as a ‘set of instructions’ that informs us about where to look at, in a 
visual scenario, but they differ with respect to these instructions being purely 
geometrical or not. Furthermore, AVS predicts that above will be considered more 
appropriate if used in an extra-linguistic context in which the lamp is above the 
chair also with respect to three possible systems of orientation or reference 
frames, for example, if the lamp is above the chair with respect to some environ-
mental landmark such as the floor (absolute reference frame), with respect to the 
chair’s top side (intrinsic reference frame), and with respect to the speaker’s ori-
entation (relative reference frame); see e.g. Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin (1994), 
Carlson (1999). 
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 Although the insights from these theories are quite enlightening and 
consistent with various approaches to vision, their approach to language is 
inherently a ‘blurry’ one, as each of these theories says virtually nothing about 
the specific contribution of nouns and adpositions. Since these theories tend to 
reduce language to general cognition, this is not surprising. Aside from this 
problem, no theory really attempts to analyze ‘dynamic’ spatial expressions. The 
same holds for L&J and FGF: Examples such as (4) and adpositions such as to are 
still a mystery, with respect to the vision–language interface. Nevertheless, both 
sides of the debate offer at least two important points regarding the nature of 
spatial vision and spatial language. 
 These aspects form the answer I shall propose to the first research question: 
 
A–1: Previous literature offers a clear mapping between vision and language (L&J), and 
evidence that spatial vision and language express possible relations between 
entities (FGF). 
 
Because of these previous proposals I shall assume, based on the literature on the 
topic, that spatial vision and spatial language are not just about geometrical 
relations, and thus suggest that both modules can express the same ‘amount’ of 
spatial information, although in (quite) different formats. I shall also assume that 
there is one precise, although flexible, correspondence between units of vision 
and units of language. Visual objects find their way in language as nouns, and 
spatial relations as adpositions, at least for English cases I shall discuss here.5 In 
the next section, I shall offer a justification to these assumptions and propose a 
richer theory of spatial vision and language. 
 
 
3. The Nature of Spatial Vision and Language, and a Formal Analysis 
 
In this section I shall offer an analysis of ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ vision (sections 3.1 
and 3.3), and a logic of vision of these theories (sections 3.2 and 3.4); I shall then 
analyze (specific aspects of) spatial language via DRT (section 3.5). 
 
3.1. Classical and Modern Varieties of Object Recognition 
 
In highly schematic terms, we can say that spatial information is processed via 
visual perception, for most human beings. Light ‘bounces’ off an object and the 
surviving wave-length is processed by the eyes. This information is then trans-
mitted to the optic nerve, to be further processed in various parts of the brain, 
like the primary and secondary visual cortex. Once the perceptual inputs are pro-
cessed, their corresponding (internal) representations become the basic chunks or 
atoms of information processed by higher cognitive functions, such as vision and 
                                                       
    5 A specific language may lack a term for a certain visual object, so the correspondence bet-
ween visual objects and nouns on the one hand, and spatial relations and adpositions on the 
other hand, may be subject to subtle cross-linguistic variation. Informally, if a language has 
a term for a certain visual object, this term will be a noun, syntax-wise: The same holds for 
spatial relations. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing my attention to this point.  
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memory. 
 One of the earliest schools of research that attempted to investigate the 
nature and properties of these units of information was the Gestalt school of psy-
chology. This school assumed that our unconscious processes of visual recog-
nition allow us to individuate objects from the background via the following four 
principles: invariance (‘sameness’ of an object), emergence (parts making up a 
whole), reification (interpolation of extra information), and multi-stability (multiple 
‘good’ images of an object). These principles converge into underlying principle 
of Prägnanz or conciseness, our ability to form discrete visual units from different, 
and perhaps contradictory, ‘streams’ of perceptual information. This process may 
not necessarily be ‘veridical’ in nature: If we look at a car in motion and we do 
not notice its radio antenna, we may consider the two objects as one, as long as 
there is no visual cue that they are indeed distinct objects (e.g., the antenna 
breaks and flies away). 
 The Gestalt school’s thrust in the study of invariant properties lost momen-
tum after the end of World War II, until Gibson (1966) re-introduced the study of 
vision as a process of ‘information-processing’ (and integration), which sparked 
the interest of various researchers,6 including David Marr and his model of vision  
which had an ever-lasting influence in vision sciences and in some linguistic liter-
ature (e.g. van der Does & van Lambalgen 2000).  
 Marr’s initial research started from the physiological bases of vision 
(collected in Vaina 1990). His interest slowly shifted from the neurological and 
perceptual facts to cognitive aspects of visual processes, which culminated in 
Marr (1982). The core assumption in Marr’s theory is that vision can be best 
understood and represented as a computational, algebraic model of information 
processing. It is a bottom-up and cognitively impenetrable process, since it is 
mostly realized without the intervention of conscious effort. 
 Marr proposed that any model, and thus any mental process or structure it 
represents, should be defined at three levels of understanding: computational 
(“why” of a model), algorithmic (the “how” of a model), and implementational (the 
“what” of a model). Marr proposed that our vision developed with a perhaps 
very abstract computational nature, that of ‘grouping’ any type of visual infor-
mation (geometric and not) into implementable units, which can be retrieved and 
stored in memory. Regardless of its purposes, Marr proposed that the computa-
tional system of human vision is assumed to have three intermediate levels of 
representation, or ‘sketches’.  
 At the Primal Sketch level, boundaries (‘zero crossings’) and edges are 
computed, so that the continuous stream of perception is partitioned into discrete 
units of attention, or ‘receptive fields’. Photo-receptive cells detect the change of 
light in the receptive fields, and split it in two parts: an ‘on-center’ and an ‘off-
center’. In ‘on-center’ cells, the cell will fire when the center is exposed to light, 
and will not fire when the surround is so exposed. In ‘off-center’ cells, the oppo-
site happens. When both types of cells fire at the same time, they are able to 
                                                       
    6 J.J. Gibson would come to reject his stance in favor of an ‘ecological’ or ‘externalist’ ap-
proach, in Gibson (1979). More information about perceptual and historical aspects can be 
found in Scholl (2001, 2007), Bruce et al. (2004), and Farah (2004), inter alia.  
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represent an entity like an edge, its adjacent ‘empty’ space and the boundary 
between the two partitions. The change of polarity between these two partitions 
is defined as a zero-crossing. A zero-crossing represents change in terms of 
opposed polarities: if an edge is marked as +1 in value, then the adjacent ‘empty’ 
part will have value –1, and a border will be represented as 0, or as a ‘boundary’. 
 At the 2½-D sketch level, these elements are integrated in the computation 
of surfaces and their distance from the observer. For instance, a triangle 
represents three lines whose edges coincide in a certain order, forming a 
connected contour, the triangle itself. Other information, such as depth or 
orientation, is computed via the integration of information about, respectively, 
the distance of the single surfaces from the observer (hence, an egocentric 
perspective), and integrated in a mean value, the normal ‘vector’ from those 
surfaces. Missing information can here be interpolated: If part of the triangle’s 
side is occluded, we may just ‘infer’ it from the orientation of the visible sides. 
 At the 3-D model level, the recognized parts and portions are integrated into 
one coherent whole. At this level, vision becomes an object-centered (or allo-
centric) process, which allows for shape recognition to be viewpoint-invariant. 
The computation of a full 3-D model (object recognition) is crucially based on 
how the computation evolves from the 2½-D sketch to its final level. If the 
various 2½-D sketches can be integrated into a coherent unit, and this computed 
unit matches with a corresponding unit in memory, then the process of ‘object’ 
recognition is successful (see also Marr & Nishihara 1978).  
 Marr’s model, given its algebraic nature, can be informally stated as a 
model in which basic information units or indexes can represent single parts of 
an object: a and b can stand for head and torso of a human figure, represented as 
the index c. If the unification or merging7 of the two more ‘basic’ information 
units a and b into a single unit is identified with a whole, then object recognition 
occurs. Simply put, from head and torso (and other parts) we obtain a human 
figure, a process that can be represented as (a+b)=c, c standing for the human 
figure index.  
 This quite informal exposition should already made clear that two basic 
principles can be identified as being part of spatial vision. One is the need to 
‘chunk’ the perceptual stream into discrete, computational units; and the other 
possibility to ‘merge’ and identify these units in a rather abstract way, which 
allows us to establish part-of relations, according to Marr, among different 
information units. 
 After Marr’s seminal work, theories of object recognition roughly 
distributed between a more representational and a more derivational stance. 
While representational theories stress relations between different objects and 
parts (or, rather, representations thereof), derivational theories stress the 
processes by which these representations come into being. I will start from the 
representational stance, introducing Recognition By Components theory (hence-
forth RBC; Biederman 1987, Hummel & Biederman 1992), probably the most 
influential theory for the representational stance. 
                                                       
    7 Here I use the term ‘merge’ in a pre-theoretic way, but I will offer a more precise definition 
in section 3.3.  
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 RBC offers an approach which is substantially similar to Marr’s original 
proposal, although it is postulated that object recognition occurs via 7 sketches of 
representation, rather than 3. One important difference is that, after the first two 
sketches are computed, each (part of an) object is conceptualized as a geon (gener-
alized ion; Biederman 1987), a primitive shape or visual ‘ur-element’.8 The combi-
nation of various geons allows to define complex forms: For instance, an ice-
cream can be idealized as a semi-sphere connected to a cone, consequently cap-
turing complex relations between the parts they represent. Whenever an object is 
successfully recognized, it can be and stored in memory as a distinct entity 
(Hummel & Stankiewicz 1996, 1998, Stankiewicz & Hummel 1996).  
 An important aspect of RBC is that it addresses how different information 
units are combined together over the time of a computation, a phenomenon 
defined as dynamic binding. Informally, if we recognize a sphere shape a and a 
cone shape b at a(n interval) time t in the computation, their integration as inte-
grated units a+b will occur at a time t+1. In this perspective, object recognition 
can be seen as a dynamic process of binding different units of information 
together, so that ‘new’ objects emerge from this process: By dynamically binding 
edges and lines together in a coherent representation we have surfaces, and by 
dynamically binding surfaces together we have three-dimensional objects, at an 
interval t+n. 
 An alternative view to this representational approach may be exemplified 
by the derivational model H-MAX (short for ‘Hierarchical MAXimization’ of 
input) of Tomaso Poggio and associates (Poggio & Edelman 1990, Riesenhuber & 
Poggio 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2002, Serre et al. 2005). In this model, objects can be 
any parts of which we receive visual input, via their luminosity, and of which we 
compute possible visual candidates (e.g., different possible representations of the 
same dog). No intermediate levels of representation are however assumed to 
exist, since the flow of information is constrained via a pair of simple principles, 
SUM and MAX, which are in turn defined over vectors as sequences of minimal 
parts and boundaries of an object. 
 An example is the following. Suppose that we look at our pet Fido, starting 
from his tail. At this initial step, our visual system first computes parts and boun-
daries, such as the tail’s tip, which can be badly lighted or ‘stilted’, if we are 
observing it by an odd angle. From this ‘vector’, we access other possible memo-
rized images of Fido’s tail and combine them with other visual features (vectors) 
we recognize about Fido. In case the image is somehow poor, we may compare it 
as a ‘noisier’ version of Fido’s tail. 
 All these vectors are then summed together in the sum vector, the averaged 
sum of the vectors corresponding to the various visual inputs. If this sum exists, 
then a ‘standard’ (or allocentric) view will be defined, which corresponds to the 
final step of the process of object recognition. In keeping track of these different 
views, ‘feature clusters’, edges of a surface or other easily observable points play 
                                                       
    8 Geons are not exactly primitives per se, but represent the (finite) set of combinations (36 in 
total) of 5 binary or multi-valued properties that combine together to define a shape. These 
five properties are: curvedness (if a component is curved or not), symmetry, axis (specifically, 
the number of axes), size, and edge type (if the edges define an abrupt or smooth ‘change of 
direction’). 
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a vital role. 
 In more formal terms, the SUM takes two visual objects and unites them 
together into a new visual object: If a and b are Fido’s head and torso, then a+b=c 
is Fido’s body. The MAX operation minimally differs from the SUM operation in 
two subtle ways. First, it may sum together two visual objects and obtain one of 
the two objects as the result, i.e. a+b=b. This is possible when one object ‘includes’ 
the other, i.e. when one visual object contains all the features of another object; 
hence, their union will be the ‘strongest’ object. Second, it may average visual 
objects representing the same entity, i.e. it may sum objects which have common 
features. In formal terms, this can be then represented as (a+b)+(b+c)=a+b+c, a 
novel visual object (the ‘average’ image) obtained out of previous objects. These 
processes are dynamic, so if two visual objects are SUMmed (MAXed) at a time t, 
the result will hold at a time t+1. 
 While these two theories show a substantial convergence in their treatment 
of object recognition, their assumptions about the nature of ‘objects’ is quite 
different. Representational theories consider an ‘object’ as the end result of a 
visual computation, while derivational theories consider an ‘object’ as any unit 
that is manipulated by a computation. This difference may appear purely theo-
retic, but it has its own relevance once we take in consideration how this infor-
mation is mapped onto linguistic units. Consider, for instance, the following 
examples: 
 
(13) The book is on the tip of the left edge of the blue table. 
(14) The book is on the table. 
 
In (13), the spatial relation is defined over a book and a rather specific part of a 
blue table, the tip of its left edge, whereas such level of detail is left implicit in 
(14). Note that this relation also informs us that the book is supported by one part 
of the table (the tip of the left edge), which in turn may be seen as not so ideal for 
supporting books (tips are intuitively worse ‘supports’ than centers). 
 For the time being, though, I shall leave aside adpositions and spatial 
relations, and concentrate on objects and nouns. In both sentences, any object or 
part thereof (‘edge’, ‘tip’) finds its linguistic realization as a noun: If there is a 
difference between different layers of visual representation, this difference dis-
appears at a linguistic level, since both visual objects are represented in language 
as nouns. Consequently, a theory of object recognition that makes no difference 
between parts and whole objects, such as H-MAX, offers an easy counterpart to 
these simple linguistic facts, while other theories are less suitable for my goal of 
offering a theory of the vision–language interface. I shall base my formal pro-
posal on vision by offering a logical treatment of H-MAX, in the next section. 
 
3.2. A Logic of Vision, Part I: Static Vision 
 
The core aspects shared by the models of static vision (object recognition) we 
have seen in the previous section are the following. First, vision involves the 
explicit, internal representation of perceptual stimuli in terms of discrete infor-
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mation units, or visual objects (of any size and shape, so to speak). Second, these 
units are combined together via one underlying principle, which we can tempo-
rarily label as ‘sum’. Third, the result of this process defines more complex 
objects, but also relations between these objects, which can be seen as instances of 
the part-of relation. These three aspects can be easily represented in one (prelimi-
nary) unified logic of vision, which I shall define as follows, and which I shall ex-
pand in more detail in section 3.4. 
 First, I shall assume that vision includes a set of visual objects, the 
(countably infinite) set V={a,b,c,...,z}. Each of these objects represents a minimal 
information unit, an output which is activated (instantiated) when some per-
ceptual input exceeds a threshold level. Hence, each information unit in a 
computation represents an instance of transduction, since it represents the (auto-
matic) conversion from one type of (input) information to another type of (out-
put) information (Pylyshyn 1984, Reiss 2007). I shall assume that each object can 
be represented as a singleton set, via ‘Quine’s innovation’: Hence, a is shorthand 
for {a}; consequently, our operations will be defined over sets (cf. Schwarzschild 
1996: appendix).  
 Second, I shall assume that one syntactic operation can be defined over 
these units, the sum operation ‘+’, an operation that I will call merge. An example 
of merge is a+b=c, which reads: “c is the merge of a and b”. It is a binary operation 
which is also associative, commutative, and idempotent. Associativity means that the 
following holds: a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c. In words, and using again the example of Fido, 
Fido’s head with Fido’s body (torso and legs) correspond to the same object as 
Fido’s upper body and legs: Fido. Commutativity means that the following 
holds: a+b=b+a. In words, Fido’s head and body form Fido, much like Fido’s 
body and head. Idempotence means that the following holds: b+b=b. Fido’s head 
and Fido’s head give us Fido’s head, that is, we can repeat information. Since our 
objects are singleton sets, this operation is basically equivalent to set union. The 
intuition behind the merge operation is that it takes two ‘old’ distinct objects and 
creates a ‘new’ object as a result, in a sense distinct from the basic sum of original 
parts. For instance, our Fido can be conceived as the new visual object that is 
obtained when the visual objects corresponding to Fido’s body and Fido’s head 
are merged together into an integrated representation, Fido as a ‘whole’ entity. 
 Third, I shall assume that one semantic relation can be defined between 
objects, the part-of relation, represented as ‘≤’. An example of the part-of relation is 
a≤b, which reads: “a is part of b”. Since I am using Quine’s innovation, the part-of 
relation is roughly equivalent to set membership.9 This relation is also binary, 
and it is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. It is reflexive, since the following 
holds: a≤a. It is transitive, because the following holds: if a≤b and b≤c, then a≤c. It 
is antisymmetric, because the following holds: if a≤b and b≤a, then a=b. In words, 
each part of Fido’s is part of itself (reflexivity); if Fido’s leg is part of Fido’s body 
and Fido’s body is part of Fido, then Fido’s leg is part of Fido (transitivity); if 
Fido’s body parts are part of Fido, and Fido consists of Fido’s body parts, then 
                                                       
    9 The subtle but very important differences between the notion of ‘set membership’ and the 
part-of relation are not important for our discussion. However, the interested reader is 
deferred to e.g. Link (1983, 1998), Landman (1991: chap. 1), Schwarzschild (1996: chap. 1) for 
discussion. 
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they are recognized as the same entity (antisymmetry). The intuition behind the 
part-of relation is that it establishes a relation between ‘old’ objects and a ‘new’ 
object as a result of the merge operation. For instance, if Fido is the result of merg-
ing Fido’s legs and Fido’s body into a ‘new’ object, then Fido’s legs will be part of 
Fido. If we recognize Fido, then we will also recognize Fido’s legs as well as other 
parts that make up Fido, as a consequence of the relation between parts and 
whole. 
 The resulting model of (object) vision emerging from these basic definitions 
is the triple S=<V,+,≤>, a simplified variant of a structure known as join lattice, a 
type of full Boolean algebra (e.g. Keenan & Faltz 1985: chap. 1, Landman 1991: 
chap. 2, Grätzer 1978: chap. 1–2). A join lattice can be seen as a set with at least 
one binary operation of composition and one relation defined over its elements, 
which also has the following property: if a≤b, then a∩b=a and a∪b=b. In words, if a 
is part of b, then the intersection of a and b is a, while the union of a and b is b. 
Informally, if the merge of two objects creates a novel object, the part of relation 
establishes that this novel object includes the old objects as its (proper) parts. 
Because of these properties, this type of Boolean algebra is a complete structure, 
i.e. it will have one maximal object including every other object (i.e. V) and one 
minimal object which is included in every other object, which we will call ‘0’, and 
which represents any instance in which we ‘fail’ to recognize objects.10 
 Since we mostly operate on individuals, i.e. singleton sets via merge and the 
part-of relation, the logic of vision I define here is substantially a first order logic. 
Since this logic allows us to define an algebraic model of objects and their inter-
pretation and relations, it is a model-theoretic approach to vision. Anticipating 
matters a bit, the discussion of the vision–language interface will coincide with 
the discussion on how this model and the model defined by language are related. 
 These logical/algebraic properties represent the following facts: The visual 
‘integration’ of Fido’s leg and Fido gives us Fido, i.e. Fido’s leg is ‘recognized’ as 
part of Fido’s whole image (union). If from Fido’s whole image we focus on 
Fido’s leg, then the other parts will be ignored (intersection). This latter inter-
pretation of ‘attention as intersection’ can be found in RBC and Ullman (1996), 
and is based on one simple intuition: If merge represents object recognition (the 
union of different visual) inputs, then its complementary operation represents 
the process by which we focus on a single visual object out of an array of objects, 
i.e. attention. Furthermore, the sum of objects forms the full ‘library’ of our model 
of vision (the maximal object V), and there can be cases in which we cannot 
recognize any object whatsoever, for instance when we fail to focus our attention 
on something (the empty object).  
 This brief and semi-formal excursus suffices for our discussion of object 
recognition. The important aspect is that we can now define a tight relation 
between the syntax and semantics of our logic of vision: For each instance of the 
                                                       
    10 Note that the operation MAX can be now reconstructed as a special instance of SUM (i.e. 
our merge). I shall leave to the reader the simple proof of this fact. Also, note that given our 
definition of the sum operation, visual objects can be either atomic, i.e. they only include 
themselves as proper parts (e.g., {a}), or non-atomic, they may have other objects as their 
proper parts (plural/sum objects: e.g., {a,b}, including {a} as its part; see e.g. Link 1983, 1998 
and Schwarzschild 1996). The import of this subtle distinction is not crucial, in this paper.  
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merge operation, the result will define another visual object and a part-of relation 
between this object and its constituent parts. Informally, we are able to recognize 
the legs of Fido as Fido’s, because we first integrate Fido’s legs with other Fido’s 
body parts into Fido’s whole image, and then retrieve this relation between legs 
and Fido. 
 The merging of visual objects does not occur in a temporal void, as we have 
seen, but is dynamically realized over discrete intervals of time. In RBC, this is 
represented via dynamic binding, i.e. the explicit representation of derivations as 
they occur over time. Before defining dynamic binding, I shall define the struc-
ture of the Index Set that represents intervals of time. This structure is the duple 
I=<t,+>, a set of intervals of time with an operation of addition. Although I repre-
sent this operation via ‘+’, it is a slightly different operation than merge, since it is 
only associative but not commutative nor idempotent. Intuitively, from a starting 
interval t we can ‘move forward’ to other intervals, e.g., t+1, t+2 and so on, via 
the simple iteration of this ‘asymmetric’ merge.  
 The corresponding type of structure is a simpler algebra, a total order, i.e. a 
structure in which each element is a distinct object. Intuitively, this structure 
represents the directed flow of the logical processes underpinning visual compu-
tations, the ‘arrow of time’ that tells us how visual objects are integrated together, 
but which cannot ‘remember’ any relations between the objects manipulated in 
these operations. 
 The explicit integration of this structure with vision is the duple Sd=<I,S>, 
the ‘dynamic’ logic of vision and object recognition. Its dynamic nature stems 
from the ability to represent visual computations as they occur over derivational 
times, in a simple format similar to standard proof-theoretic (i.e. syntactic) com-
ponent of various logical systems (see e.g. Landman 1991 for discussion). One 
example is the following: 
 
(15) t. a    (visual object instantiation, e.g. Fido’s head) 
 t+1. b    (visual object instantiation, e.g. Fido’s body) 
 t+2. a+b   (merge introduction) 
 t+3. (a+b)=c  (Fido as ‘sum’ of Fido’s parts) 
 t+4. a≤c   (part-of introduction, Fido’s head as part of Fido) 
 
This derivation roughly captures how the process of recognizing Fido may occur 
a dynamic (and bottom-up) way, modeling the actual processes described in the 
reviewed theories. The various objects are first recognized (‘instantiated’ in the 
derivational space) one by one and then merged via the introduction of this oper-
ation. Once this process is over, we can also access the relation between Fido’s 
head and Fido’s whole image, since we can establish that one is part of another.  
 This simple example of a derivation in our logic of vision may not capture 
all the aspects involved in visual computations and, to an extent, it is quite ideal-
ized: For instance, an individual may consciously assume (and thus exert a top-
down choice) that he is seeing Fido’s body, since he can partially recognize it as a 
visual entity connected to Fido’s head. In this and other examples, I shall leave 
these matters aside, as they are not crucial, for our discussion. This example, 
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however, introduces one important advantage of my theory over the theories I 
reviewed so far: it makes fully explicit the structural relations between the 
various components of the object recognition process, including its unfolding 
over time. This logic of vision is still a preliminary proposal, since for one thing, 
it does not allow us to make a distinction between objects (individual constants 
such as e.g., a) and the properties they instantiate (e.g., constant functions such as 
dog’). It also cannot represent spatial representations, and thus the visual content 
of adpositions, but this is a void that will be filled in section 3.4, along with a 
theory of visual properties. However, it already allows us to give a compact defi-
nition on how we see things in the world, at least with respect to static objects. 
 Now we can explicitly represent (visual) objects in a very preliminary 
logical space, and we can also define how these objects are mapped onto their 
corresponding linguistic labels, nouns. I shall assume, differently from previous 
proposals such as L&J, that this mapping is an isomorphism, a one-to-one 
correspondence between objects of different types (i.e. visual objects to noun 
labels). The reasons for this assumption are the following. The discussion of 
examples (13) and (14), and the intuition that each visual object may (potentially) 
have a corresponding ‘noun’ label, has one important theoretical consequence. If 
we define a function mapping visual objects to nouns, then this function will be 
injective, it will find at least a label n’ for each visual object v: A noun like table, for 
instance, stands for the corresponding visual object, a table. Furthermore, it is 
possible that several visual objects can correspond to one linguistic label: A noun 
such as ‘table’ also stands for the sum of legs, surface, edges, and other visual 
objects making up a table. Hence, this mapping function will be surjective as well.  
 A function which is injective and surjective is a bijective function, hence a 
function that defines an isomorphism. More formally, for each visual object v, for 
each noun label n’, there will be a function f such that : f(v)=n’. Since this function 
is surjective, the following holds: given a+b+c=v then f(a+b+c)=n’. In words, we 
have the ‘lexical’ identity edge’+legs’=table’, which can be also indirectly 
represented as f(a+b)=f(a)+f(b), with f(a)=edge’, f(b)=legs’ and f(a+b)=table’. 
Furthermore, this isomorphism preserves relations, so if one object is part of 
another, one corresponding noun will be lexically related to another. We have 
f(a)≤f(b), which in words says that edge is (lexically) related to table.  
 This isomorphism can be interpreted as follows. Our logic of vision is a 
partial, yet very fine-grained model of object recognition, with a simple yet rich 
hierarchical structure, defined by the part-of relations that can be established 
between the objects in this domain. The function f tells us that such structure can 
also be connected with other structures, provided that they are governed by the 
same (logical) principles. Informally, it allows us to potentially define a corres-
pondence between nouns in language and visual objects in vision, on a one-to-
one basis. Although a language may lack a specific lexical item for each visual 
object, it is at least possible to define such a tight correspondence between nouns 
on the one hand, and visual objects on the other hand.  
 This function can be thus thought as representing a top-down, conscious 
(and optional) process, which occurs when we consciously match visual 
information against linguistic information. It allows to define a correspondence 
between simple and complex visual objects and the nouns that represent these 
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objects at a linguistic level, e.g., to establish that a noun such as table can indeed 
refer to11 a visual object we may observe, and which is made of four legs, a 
surface and other relevant parts. With this notion in place, then, we have 
introduced enough ‘machinery’ to handle the static side of vision and its logic; 
we need to focus on the neglected dynamic side, and propose a full logic of 
vision, by which we can also analyze spatial representations/relations. I shall do 
so in the next two sections. 
 
3.3.  Theories of Dynamic Vision 
 
In the discussion in the two previous sections, I have introduced a view of spatial 
vision in which the ability to explicitly represent objects and their relations plays 
a crucial part in ‘static’ scenarios, i.e. cases in which we ‘find’ objects which are 
not changing position over time. One aspect missing from this discussion is how 
we establish relations between objects, especially when they change position over 
time — how dynamic spatial vision comes about. 
 A preliminary step to answer these questions is to define how we can keep 
track of objects over time. For this purpose, I shall review a theory about dynamic 
object tracking: Multiple Object Tracking (MOT), introduced in Pylyshyn (1989) 
and developed in a number of successive works (e.g. Pylyshyn 1994, 2001, 2003, 
2004, 2006, and Pylyshyn & Annan 2006; see Kahneman et al. 1992 for the roughly 
equivalent Object File Theory).  
 MOT offers a theory about object recognition in dynamic scenarios by anal-
yzing how we are able to individuate and form mental representations of objects 
in the way they instantiate some properties (e.g., being yellow in color), and by 
how we maintain or change these representations over time and the unfolding of 
events. MOT is probably best presented via a preliminary example. Imagine that 
we look at the panorama: We detect trees, clouds, buildings, and so on. If we 
focus our attention on a flying black swan, we can do so because we are first able 
to detect a mysterious object (call it ‘x’), which instantiates the properties “swan”, 
“black”, and “flying”, among others. 
 With some imagination, we can assume that “swan” is the primitive and 
most basic property which allows us to recognize the mysterious entity as such, 
the equivalent of an imaginary finger stretching from our eyes to the object itself. 
Such a finger allows us to define the mysterious object in terms of what property 
it instantiates, and it is thus defined as Finger of INSTantiation, or FINST. The very 
act of this process is usually defined as FINSTing in the literature and, since it can 
be defined for any entity that can be so individuated, it makes no distinction 
between types of objects: Everything which can be FINSTed is an object, simply 
enough. 
 It is useful to illustrate MOT’s notation for the basic process of FINSTing, as 
well as the addition of further features. I will follow Pylyshyn’s (1989) notation, 
for ease of exposition. Aside from the basic process of FINSTing, we can imagine 
                                                       
    11 The notion of ‘reference’ I use here is not equivalent to the one commonly employed. A 
standard assumption is that reference is the relation between a term and the ‘real world’ ob-
ject that corresponds to a given term. Here and for the rest of the paper, I shall assume that 
linguistic terms can refer to extra-linguistic but internal information, such as visual objects.  
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a situation in which the black swan is flying above a cloud. The process of 
FINSTization is illustrated in (16), while (17) illustrates the more complex ‘above’ 
case: 
 
(16) a. FINST[x],[swan]=(x:swan) 
 b. FINST[x:swan],[x:black]=(x:swan,x:black) 
 
(17) ABOVE(x:swan, x:black, x: f lying, y:cloud) 
 
In (16a), a basic property like “swan” is mapped onto a visual object, acting as the 
FINST that tracks the visual object. In (16b), the combination of two properties 
acting as FINSTs creates a new, more complex FINST, which identifies the visual 
object x as a black swan. In the case of (17), we can observe that such ‘internal 
fingers’ can also define relations between simpler ‘fingers’, hence expressing a 
relation between different instances of the same underlying process.  
 This relation is, in turn, a description or property of an event of motion, in 
which the swan is the moving figure, while the cloud is the contingent ground. 
Further information can be stacked up via dynamic binding: Informally, each 
individuating property for x can be in a temporally incremental fashion (e.g., 
“black” at time t, “flying” at time t+1), which in turn is realized via the iterated 
application of the FINST operation. 
 One problem emerging from the presentation of MOT is that this theory 
cannot easily be used to analyze how the temporal relations between properties 
can be defined and represented in their own right. While “black” may be instanti-
ated after “swan”, we cannot explicitly represent that the corresponding ‘fingers’ 
can be taken as entities in their own right, the events during which these proper-
ties are instantiated and combined together, or defined in terms of their order of 
occurrence. 
 One theory that aims to fill this conceptual void is Event Segmentation 
Theory (henceforth: EST), a theory of events and psychological events first 
outlined in Zacks & Tversky (2001) and Zacks et al. (2001). In this theory, an ori-
ginal philosophical intuition by Quine (1960) and further developed in Davidson 
(1967) acts as the basic insight and ontological assumption: that our understand-
ing of the world includes not only objects, but also the events in which these ob-
jects are involved.  
 At one level of comprehension, our mind represents objects as “things that 
are in the world”, such as birds and apples and cups. Once we add a temporal 
level of comprehension, and thus we observe how things change or preserve 
their own identity through time, we also keep track of what causes may change 
the properties of an object. The focus of EST is on events, which are treated as 
‘pegs’, basic computational units or ‘slots’ on which we stack up information, 
and which stand for relations and order among relations in which objects are 
involved, as they unfold over time (Speer et al. 2003, Zacks 2004, Zacks et al. 2007, 
Zacks & Swallow 2007, Reynolds et al. 2007, Tversky et al. 2008). 
 EST assumes that, at a minimum, we can observe objects at two levels. One 
basic level is that of their structure and how it is realized in space (partonomy) and 
one of an object and its relation to an abstract class (e.g., a chair as part of 
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furniture: taxonomy). Once we take in consideration a temporal dimension, in 
which objects can have different properties in different intervals of time, we will 
have ‘dynamic’ objects or events. Events are conceived as discrete information 
units derived (i.e. transduced) from perceptual information, i.e. the ‘indexes’ 
attributed to the combination of a (rather abstract) visual property and the object 
that instantiates it.  
 For instance, if someone throws a cup on the floor, then the cup will likely 
be shattered into pieces because of this action. The temporary relation between 
an individual and the cup will bring about a new state of affairs in which the cup 
will be a new property of some sort, that of being shattered. At the same time, we 
represent this change via the temporal and causal relation between the two state of 
affairs, one involving an event of someone shattering the cup, and another in 
which the cup will be shattered, which is separated by a boundary event, an 
interval of time in which neither the cup is shattered nor it is still intact, and in 
which we will need to ‘update’ our model of events. Events can also be combined 
together: If someone is stacking pillows, each single pillow-stacking event can be 
combined into a ‘bigger’ pillow-stacking event, and possibly ‘merged’ with other 
events, forming a more complex event such as ‘pillow-ordering’.  
 Such complex sequences of events can be seen as event models or schema-
ta, structures of events and their causal/temporal connections, as they are repre-
sented in short-term memory (models) or stored in long-term memory (schemata in 
‘semantic memory’: see e.g. Tulving 1972, 1983, 2000a, 2000b, 2002 and references 
therein for an introduction). Events can be dynamically bound: The “throwing” 
event occurs at a time t+1, a boundary event is formed at a time t+2 and the 
“shattering” event occurs at a time t+3, then there will be a causal, as well as 
temporal relation between these events. 
 Both MOT and EST are theories that offer a detailed picture of how 
dynamic vision can occur, defining in detail the mechanisms by which we track 
objects in motion, and the complex spatial representations that arise from this 
process, or events. One alternative view to these approaches that offers some 
further important insights on spatial representations is the Hippocampus as a 
Cognitive Map theory (HCM) of O’Keefe & Nadel (1978). HCM started as a study 
of rats’ navigational system, the way they represent objects and their places in the 
environment, and how this information is memorized and accessed or updated at 
later stages. According to this theory, humans (and rats) build up a complex spa-
tial representation of the environment via two parallel systems: the place and the 
misplace system. The place system records information about objects’ position in 
the environment, and ‘checks’ whether this information is correct when visual 
information is processed. If an object has changed position, then the misplace 
system records the change of position and updates the object’s new position ac-
cordingly. 
 This model has been further extended over the years. O’Keefe (1983, 1990, 
1991) and Burgess & O’Keefe (1996, 2003) show that information about objects 
and their relations is processed, in ‘real time’, by the navigational system. This 
system computes the location of a figure in terms of polar angle Φ and distance d 
from the ground as the relation θ(Φ,d), computed via θ-rhythm signals, which 
mostly originate in the Hippocampus.  
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 The result of these computations can be modeled as a vector, a sequence of 
cells (Boundary Vector Cells) that fire when an observer visually tracks relevant en-
tities in an environment, and can also allow to compute geometrical properties of 
objects. Hence, the place and misplace systems build up complex spatial repre-
sentations over time, or Cognitive Maps (O’Keefe & Burgess 1999, Burgess et al. 
2002, and Burgess 2006a, 2006b; see Arsenijević 2008 for a linguistic proposal). 
 These theories give us a basic insight on the nature of dynamic spatial 
vision. When we keep track of objects in motion, we do via the properties that 
objects may have over time, whether they are geometrical, functional or ‘functi-
onal’, insofar as they allow us to track objects in space. At the same time, we also 
keep track of the relations between these properties and their order of causal/ 
temporal occurrence: Spatial representations have an inherent temporal dimen-
sion, which represents the structural relations between the events making up 
these representations.  
 Adpositions, as the chief part of speech expressing these relations, must 
also have such an abstract nature. Look at the examples: 
 
(18) Mario has fallen onto the floor. 
(19) Mario has gone into the room. 
(20) Mario is sitting near the patio. 
 
A scenario which is more or less depicted by (18) and (19) is one in which Mario 
is on the floor and in the room, respectively, as a consequence of a particular 
event, one of falling and one of going. A scenario depicted by (20) is one in which 
Mario is involved in an event of sitting, which occurs at some distance from the 
patio. He may be involved in other events, although these events are in a sense 
‘backgrounded’, in the sentence.  
 In all three cases, the spatial relation holding between Mario and different 
grounds holds at some moment of time because of some previous event, and 
involves more than just geometrical information. If we conceive Mario and the 
floor as inherently visual objects, then the adposition onto will capture not only 
that these two objects are currently related one another via a ‘support’ relation, 
but also that such relation has come into being because of a previous falling 
event. Since adpositions seem to express the ‘logical’ structure behind the events 
described by a sentence, the kind of spatial representations they capture are 
representations in logical space, and define possible relations between objects 
and how they are represented in this logical space. I shall offer the precise logical 
details of this enriched logical space in the next section, in the proposal I shall call 
Visual Representation Theory. 
 
3.4. A Logic of Vision, Part II: A Model of Visual Logical Space 
 
In the previous section, we have been able to define a richer notion of visual 
object (i.e. things and their spatio-temporal properties), as well as sketching the 
nature of the relations holding between these objects. I shall integrate these 
results in our logic of vision as follows. 
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 First, I shall assume that the set V of visual objects is now made of 
‘structured’ entities, the combination of events e, objects o, and properties pr. The 
complex visual object that is made of these elements is the triple v=<e,o,pr>, a 
basic entity which I shall call Visual Representation Structure (VRS). Importantly, 
the set of events E (with e≤E) is disjointed from that of objects O (with o≤O) and 
the union of the two sets forms the whole set of (basic) visual objects, i.e. E∩O=0 
and E∪O=V. Properties pr form a set of properties by which these visual objects 
can be individuated, i.e. we have pr≤PR. In words, VRSs are made of basic objects 
(e.g. ‘x’), the properties by which we individuate them (e.g. “swan”), and the 
events in which these properties are instantiated, i.e. their position in logical 
space with respect to other events. The following will hold: v≤V, i.e. each VRS is 
part of the set of VRSs. I shall represent a VRS as e:pr(o), which reads: An event e 
instantiates a property pr of an object o. This format follows the format of DRT, 
which I shall introduce in full in section 3.5. 
 We thus have seen that VRSs can be combined together via merge. The sum 
of two VRSs can be seen as a complex, novel event in which different properties 
of the same object can be combined together into a more complex, novel proper-
ty. If e:grab(x) and h:order(x) are respectively an event of (pillow) grabbing and 
(pillow) ordering, then the complex event of (pillow) clean up can be formally 
defined as: (e:grab(x)+h:order(x))=i:clean-up(x)). 
 The structural properties of merge (associativity, commutativity, idempo-
tence) are defined over VRSs as well, although the apparent ‘temporal’ nature of 
VRSs as representing ‘objects in motion’ requires some discussion. I shall focus 
on events, to make the discussion simple. An event of (pillow) clean-up can be 
organized in different ways (associativity); while we usually first grab pillows 
and then order them, when we clean up, an event of (pillow) clean-up consists of 
both events, regardless of their linear order (commutavity); several events of 
pillow-grabbing are still a (complex) event of pillow-grabbing (idempotence). 
Although VRSs are more complex objects, their ‘combination’ can be nevertheless 
defined via one basic operation, that of merge, which represents how complex 
VRSs are created from the union of basic VRSs. 
 The part-of relation is also defined over VRSs and events, and allows to 
define how events are structured. Reflexivity and transitivity allow to establish 
order/overlap among complex sequences of VRSs, straightforwardly enough. 
Antisymmetry allows to establish whether two VRSs (or parts thereof) are really 
the same, and thus to establish the identity between a complex VRS and the sum 
of its constituting VRSs. It also allows us to reconstruct their consequential/ 
temporal relation as well: if e:grab(x)≤i:clean-up(x), then e:grab(x)∪i:clean-
up(x)=i:clean-up(x) and e:grab(x)∩i:clean-up(x)=e:grab(x). Since an event of pillow-
grabbing is a proper part of (pillow) cleaning up, then it must precede the 
realization of a cleaning up event. The structural relations between events thus 
represent their causal/temporal relations: ‘New’ events come into being as the 
result of ‘old’ events being combined together, in an incremental fashion. If we 
don’t grab and order pillows, we won’t have an event of pillow-cleaning up: The 
existence of this event is a consequence of the combination of previous events. 
 The tight relation between the syntax and semantics of our logic of vision 
thus allows us to capture one aspect of ‘dynamic’ space by simply looking at how 
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events are computed, without introducing further principles of analysis. Our 
new logic of vision can be thus represented as S=<V,+,≤>, with V being a short-
hand for V=<E,O,PR>.  
 This new logic of vision is a fully dynamic logic of vision when combined 
with an index set I, i.e. when we have Sd=<I,V>, with I being the index structure 
I=<t,+>. It allows us to explicitly represent how we integrate VRS together, one 
example being the following: 
 
(21) t. e:grab(x)              (VRS instantiation) 
 t+1. h:order(x)             (VRS instantiation) 
 t+2. e:grab(x)+h:order(x)          (merge introduction) 
 t+3. e:grab(x)+h:order(x) =i:clean-up(x)      (sum of events) 
 t+4. e:grab(x)≤i:clean-up(x)         (part-of rel. intr.) 
 
In words, the merging of two VRSs yields a more complex VRS as the result, and 
allows to establish structural relations between VRSs. As we can see, the use of 
dynamic binding also allows us to bring out one aspect of the temporal nature of 
events: If we grab a pillow at a time t and then put it in order at a time t+1, then 
the resulting pillow-cleaning up event will be realized as a later time t+3, in a 
progressive way. 
 At this point, we have a quite rich and thorough logic of vision which allows 
us to model spatial representations/relations in a rather elegant and simple way, 
and which turns out to be somewhat similar to similar other logical theories 
proposed in, for example, the AI literature (e.g. Event Calculus; see Hamm & van 
Lambalgen 2005 and references therein and van der Does & van Lambalgen 2000 
and e.g. Barwise & Seligman 1997 for non-linguistic applications of situation 
semantics). One example of the elegance behind our logic is the notion of 
‘location’. VRSs explicitly represent the spatio-temporal ‘location’ of some event 
and its participants by representing the properties that individuate these entities. 
Geometric or mechanical properties are not any different from ‘grabbing’ 
properties, with respect to how this process occurs over time: we can thus 
represent e.g., the notion of inclusion as the VRS e:in(x), that of support as e:on(x) 
and so on. 
 We can then represent the notion of ‘motion’, or more appropriately the 
notion of change, as an ordering (part-of) relation between VRSs and the events 
they represent. So, if Mario goes in direction of the room and then stops once he’s 
in the room, he will be in the room as a consequence of this event of motion. This 
can be represented as e:go(r)<i:in(r), i.e. an event of going into the room as 
expressing the relation holding between one event and its consequence. In a 
scenario in which Mario is sitting near the patio instead, other events may be 
going on at the same time, but at least these properties allow us to individuate 
Mario. We can represent this as n:near(p)≤z:gen(p), an event of (sitting) near the 
patio as part of a more generic event.  
 These relations between VRSs and the events they represent may find their 
way into language chiefly as adpositions via the function f, the isomorphism 
between vision and language. I shall re-define this function as follows. If f takes a 
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pair of visual object and property as an input, it will return a noun as an output 
— we have f(<o,pr>)=n’. If f takes a pair of event and property as an input, it will 
return a verb as an output — we have f(<e,pr>)=v’. If it takes a full VRS as an 
input, it will return an adposition as a result — we have f(<e,o,pr>)=p’.   
 The intuition is that ‘partial’ VRSs find their way in language as (common) 
nouns, labels for objects, and as verbs, labels for ‘actions’; both individuate some 
entities, but do not express relations between these entities. Adpositions instead 
express the structural relations between VRSs, ultimately complex VRSs. The 
intuition is simple: Nouns (and verbs) find objects in logical space; adpositions 
denote the relations between these objects, which in turn represent a very 
abstract notion of space. L&J’s syntactic proposals are still maintained, to an 
extent.12  
 The function f, as an isomorphism, preserves structure on VRSs as well: An 
adposition like between, for instance, is usually analyzed as the ‘sum’ of two 
simpler adpositions, such as to the left or to the right of some ground (e.g. Zwarts & 
Winter 2000). This can be represented as f(r-of+l-of)=f(r-of)+f(l-of), i.e. the adpo-
sition representing the “between” relation is lexically equivalent with the adposi-
tions representing the relations “to the left of” and “to the right of”. Generalizing 
a bit, from basic spatial representations we can build more complex spatial 
relations; the complex structure defined by this process, the model of logical 
space defined by our logic of vision, may be represented in language up to 
isomorphism, via process of progressive refinement and specificity of relations (cf. 
also Levinson & Meira 2003). Hence, the mapping function f may assign different 
labels to its outputs, depending on the level of fine-grainedness and with some 
consistent cross-linguistic variation, but in a quite fine-grained and structurally 
regular way (cf. again Talmy 2000; see also section 4.2). Again, via this function 
we represent the possibility that we can match for each VRS a corresponding 
linguistic unit, and that the structural or ‘spatial’ relations between VRSs can find 
their way into language, chiefly as adpositions, at least in a language such as 
English. 
 Before moving to language, however, I shall make one observation 
regarding the nature of this process. According to the HCM proposal, when we 
mentally represent visual objects, these objects can be seen as output to some 
previous visual, perceptual input, which is then transduced as a visual object. 
This process occurs over discrete intervals of time, which in turn may be seen as 
minimal cycles of the θ-rhythm, and which may actually occur independently of the 
presence of external stimuli. In the absence of external stimuli, our brain still 
partitions the perceptual stream into minimal, discrete units. Very informally, 
our vision faculty will organize the perceptual stream into minimal units even if 
we are not observing finite objects such as tables, or if we look at the same 
portion of sky for quite a long interval of time. 
 When external stimuli are tracked, then it is possible to check whether they 
stand for some ‘new’ or ‘old’ information, i.e. whether their internal represen-
tation matches previous visual computations. Hence, the underlying properties 
                                                       
    12 In this paper, I shall not propose an explanation on why the function f seems to operate such 
distinctions in the labeling process, and leave such a complex topic for future research.  
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of these computations do not crucially hinge on external stimuli, but on the 
possibility (perhaps, necessity) to integrate these different forms of information 
together in an effortless way, and in a coherent, ‘synchronized’ model (e.g., 
O’Keefe 2003, Buzśaki 2006). Our logic of vision thus represents an internal 
model of logical space, and represents the properties and relations defined over 
this model. By this point, our discussion of the logic of vision should be thorough 
enough: I shall concentrate on spatial language and its logic. 
 
3.5. A Logic of Language: Discourse Representation Theory and Space 
 
The study of meaning in natural language as a psychological phenomenon has 
long been adversed in model-theoretic approaches, traditionally rooted in an 
‘anti-psychologist’ philosophy (e.g. Davidson 1967, Montague 1973, Cresswell 
1985). Some modern research, however, broke with this tradition and attempted 
to study whether the models defined in this approach can be seen as mental 
structures and processes of some sort, represented via dynamic logic (e.g. Kamp 
1981, Heim 1982, Chierchia & Turner 1988, Kamp & Reyle 1993, Chierchia 1995).  
 Among these different approaches, Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) 
represents the most important theory with such a ‘cognitive’ stance, and offers a 
set of tools which will allow us to (easily) treat all the linguistic phenomena we 
shall address via a single set of formal tools. For instance, it includes detailed 
treatments of the semantics of nouns and temporal expressions, which can be 
extended to treat our adpositions data (e.g., theories of noun reference and 
plurality such as Link 1983, 1998 or treatments of events such as Parsons 1990 
and Landman 2000, 2004). It also allows us to take a perspective to sentence 
interpretation as a dynamic process, since it aims to model how sentences are 
interpreted and ‘used’ to form models in a compositional and incremental and 
on-line fashion, as in models of parsing such as Crain & Steedman (1985).  
 The version I shall use here is also fully compositional and thus allows us 
to analyze the contribution of each word to a sentence (iKamp et al. 2005, based 
on Muskens 1996 and van Eijck & Kamp 1997), and may be ideally implemented 
with certain minimalist theories of syntax with a ‘processing stance’ (parser-is-
grammar of Phillips 1996). However, I shall focus on the contribution of nouns 
and adpositions for the most part, being somewhat sloppy on other parts of 
speech (such as verbs). Although the structural equivalences with my logic of 
vision should be immediately obvious, I will defer a thorough discussion to 
section 4.1, and focus here on the linguistic bits. 
 The most basic bits of information in DRT are Discourse Representation 
Structures (DRSs). A DRS can be thought, at a minimum, as a linguistic infor-
mation state containing a set of discourse referents (or U for universe), an ‘object’ 
in discourse, and the conditions (or CON) which allow us to individuate such 
objects in discourse. While basic (‘extensional’) DRSs are at a minimum a duple 
of discourse referents (or individuals, for the sake of clarity) and their associated 
conditions, they ‘become’ information states when a third set of objects is taken 
in consideration, possible worlds (the set W). Hence, a DRS or information state 
is the triple <W,U,CON> or <{w},{x},{con’(x)}>, in which a discourse referent is 
paired with a ‘world’ referent and a condition, and which can be seen as a mental 
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representation or (mini-)model that a speaker entertains, when he parses chunks 
of sentences, incrementally. 
 The nature of this world ‘coordinate’ deserves a few words of discussion. 
In classical logic, possible worlds are seen as quite real Leibnizian entities, such 
as the world we live in (e.g. Lewis 1986). Many versions of DRT, however, 
propose a different approach, partially based on Stalnaker’s (1973, 1999) work,13 
in which possible worlds are mental objects, and represent nothing else than 
possible scenarios in which referents are involved, those for instance expressed 
by a sentence or a more complex text. Consequently, possible worlds can vary in 
‘size’ and structure, and may be intuitively related one another according to the 
same principles definable over individuals, DRSs or other model-theoretical 
objects, as assumed in situations semantics (e.g., Barwise & Etchemendy 1990, 
Kratzer 1989, 2007) or modern modal logic (Hughes & Cresswell 1996, Blackburn 
et al. 2006).  
 Let us now turn to formal matters. As a standard convention, I write 
conditions in boldfaced characters and by adding a prime, i.e. ‘con’’. Hence, 
conditions in DRT are roughly equivalent to non-logical constants of first-order 
logic, and thus they represent ‘concepts’ or ‘thoughts’ as they are expressed in 
natural language, together with the distinction between intension and extension 
(cf. Margolis & Laurence 1999, Gärdenfors 2000, Winter 2008). The obvious con-
sequence of this assumption is that our concepts/conditions will thus be invari-
ably complex and definable in terms of their internal structure, unlike assumed in 
atomistic theories of concepts such as Fodor (1998, 2003). While an interesting 
topic per se, its discussion would lead us too far afield from our main topic of 
discussion, so I shall leave it aside for the time being.14 
 For our purposes, worlds and eventualities (i.e. events, properties changing 
over time, and states, properties holding over time) are basically the same 
(model-theoretic) objects, as in some variants of situation semantics. Very inform-
ally, if individuals represent objects, then eventualities represent the relations in 
which individuals are involved.15 I shall use the term ‘events’ and avoid making 
any distinction between events and states, for the sake of clarity.  
 Once I have defined the basic structures of DRSs, I shall focus on the com-
binatorial and interpretative apparatus, i.e. how DRSs can be used to represent 
linguistic expressions. Here I shall use a variant of the ‘linear’ notation, rather 
than the more popular ‘box’ format, to enhance readability (as in Geurts 1999). I 
shall roughly match one syntactic phrase with one DRS, although more precise 
analyses are possible (see Kamp et al. 2005 for discussion). Look at the example: 
 
                                                       
    13 This is true insofar as we look at the ‘raw mechanics’ of the underlying logic. Stalnaker’s 
position is not a mentalist/internalist one: For him, ‘possible worlds’ are those of classical 
logic. DRT offers a much stronger mentalist perspective. Very informally, ‘worlds’ in DRT 
are roughly equivalent to possible thoughts or beliefs, information states ascribed to 
(thinking) agents. See Maier (2006: chap. 1) for discussion.  
    14 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this topic to my attention. 
    15 Note that, informally speaking, events and states are included in intervals of time, within 
the DRT architecture, with intervals of time forming up the main ‘temporal structure’ of a 
discourse. I shall diverge from DRT and use intervals of time in a different way, as I shall 
show in the remainder of the section. 
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(22) A man walks quickly. He whistles. 
 
When a sentence like (22) is parsed, the parser builds up a bottom-up, left-to-
right syntactic representation and, for each constituent and phrase, it builds up 
the corresponding DRS. For instance, a man is parsed as noun phrase/determiner 
phrase, and interpreted as the DRS [x:man’(x)], a DRS representing a referent x 
and a condition individuating him. 
 The next step consists in combining the predicate walks with the noun 
phrase a man. This is obtained via the syntactic operation merge, which shall 
represent as ‘+’.16 Merge in DRT is a binary (associative, commutative, idem-
potent) operation that takes two DRSs and gives a ‘bigger’ (or new) DRS as the 
output, by unifying the universes and conditions of each DRS. In more formal 
terms, we have: 
 
(23) [{x}:con’(x)]+[{y}:con’(y)]=[{x,y}:con’(x),con’(y)]  (merge introduction) 
 
In words, the merging of two DRSs forms a bigger DRS in which the universes 
and the conditions are merged pair-wise. Merged conditions are interpreted as 
being conjoined. If we were to translate conditions from our DRT language to 
first order logic, merged conditions would be interpreted as being conjoined, 
whereas each referent in the universe of discourse can be translated as an 
existentially quantified variable. We would have “∃x∃y[con’(x)&con’(y)]” for the 
two conditions in (23) (cf. Kamp et al. 2005: 143–145). I shall use brackets to mark 
the universe, and thus enhance readability (e.g. {x,y}), as in van Eijck & Kamp 
1997 and Kamp et al. (2005).  
 The verb walks can now be simply represented as [e:walk’(x)], i.e. a DRS 
which introduces no new (object) referents but a novel spatio-temporal referent, 
the event of walking. The merging of the two resulting DRS can be represented, 
in a piece-meal fashion, as: 
 
(24) t. [{x}:man’(x)]+[{e}:e:walk’(x)]=[{e,x}:man’(x), e:walk’(x)] (merge intr.) 
 t+1. [{e,x}:man’(x),e:walk’(x)]+[{e}:quickly’(e)]=     (merge intr.) 
 t+2. [{e,x}:man’(x),e:walk’(x), e:quickly’(e)] 
 
In words, we obtain the DRS representing the first sentence in (22) (A man walks 
quickly), by merging the DRSs representing its main constituting phrases. The 
DRS for a man acts as the context DRS, which is then updated via merge by the 
DRS for walks, acting as the context change potential DRS. The dynamic aspect of 
meaning is thus represented by the ability for new phrases/words to add more 
information regarding referents and events represented by each sentence, and 
thus define a ‘broader’ model representing facts. This is also represented via the 
explicit use of an index set in the derivations, which allows to explicit represent 
                                                       
    16 Kamp et al. (2005) use a different symbol, but this difference is immaterial, for our purposes. 
Note also that the properties of merge (associativity, commutativity, idempotence) stem 
from its definition as a (complex) form of set union, with idempotence allowing to ‘reduce’ 
universes whenever they are identical (see e.g. (22), i.e. {e,x}+{e,x}={e,x}). 
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how DRSs are combined together (as in Muskens 1996 and van Eijck & Kamp 
1997, for example).17  
 The merging of DRSs has also one important consequence: it defines a 
semantic level of relations between DRSs and their universes/conditions, the 
accessibility/part-of relation. The accessibility/part-of relation is a transitive, anti-
symmetric, reflective relation which allows to define one DRS d as part of another 
DRS d’, i.e. d≤d’. While transitivity and reflexivity intuitively define how DRSs 
are connected over the flow of discourse, antisymmetry allows to make establish 
what relation holds between two referents/events/DRSs. One example is pro-
noun resolution: Intuitively, a pronoun such as he in (20) denotes one whistling 
individual as being a specific individual out of those who are walking quickly in 
the park. If at least part of the content expressed by two DRSs can be the same, 
then the two DRSs individuate the same object, a condition which expresses an 
anaphoric relation and is usually represented as x=y.18 When the accessibility 
relation is restrained to discourse referents or events, it is usually called part-of 
relation (e.g. Kamp et al. 2005: 135). Consequently, I shall just use the part-of label 
for a semantic relation holding between DRSs, in order to make the exposition of 
the arguments clearer. 
 This is shown in the remainder of the derivation for (20): 
 
(25) t+3.  [{e,x}:man’(x),e:walk’(x),e:quickly’(x)]+[{e,y}:y=?,e:whistle’(y)]= 
 t+4.  [{e,x,y}:man’(x),e:walk’(x),e:quickly’(e),y=x,e:whistle’(y)] 
 
In words, the merging of the first and second sentence will also establish an 
identity relation between first walking man and second whistling man: There is 
really one man we are talking about, in (22). The resolution of the open anaphoric 
relation (i.e. x=?) amounts to identifying two referents by stating that the 
properties by which these referents are individuated converge to the same result.  
 After this brief introduction to the relevant aspect of DRT, I shall focus on a 
compact treatment of adpositions, which diverges from the standard DRT 
treatment of this category (cf. Kamp et al. 2005: chap. 2–3) and introduce a more 
thorough analysis of these terms, based on the vast literature on the topic. My 
basic assumption will match the non-linguistic considerations I offered in the 
previous section: Adpositions denote relations between DRSs, by expressing how 
the events denoted by these relations are ordered (e.g., Kamp 1979a, 1979b, 
Jackendoff 1983, Parsons 1990, Wunderlich 1991, Nam 1995, Fong 1997, Kracht 
2002, Landman 2004, Zwarts 2005, Svenonius 2006, Ramchand 2008, and Kratzer, 
to appear).  
                                                       
    17 In the dynamic semantics literature, the notion of ‘dynamic binding’ has a more restricted 
(semantic) application, and it is restricted to inter-sentential merge, i.e. the binding of infor-
mation units over the sentence boundary (e.g., Chierchia 1995, Stockhof et al. 1996).  
    18 Pronoun resolution is sensible to features, like gender and number or temporal/aspectual 
values. I just ignore these aspects here, for the sake of clarity. In DRT, pronoun resolution 
also involves presupposition resolution, what could be (very) informally defined as the 
integration of implicit information in a DRS, together with the resolution of the anaphoric 
relations associated with this implicit information. See, among others, van der Sandt (1988, 
1992), Geurts (1999), and Kamp et al. (2005: chap. 1–2) for discussion and references on this 
very complex and rich topic.  
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 I shall thus assume that adpositions denote anaphoric relations between 
events/DRSs. Differently from pronoun anaphora, though, they may express 
‘asymmetric’ relations, i.e. relations in which events are not necessarily identical. 
In this perspective, adpositions are akin to the ‘duplex conditions’ of DRT, which 
are used to represent quantifiers such as every, but also conditionals (e.g., donkey 
sentences), temporal adverbs and other temporal/logical relations. 
 The main reason for this assumption can be motivated by the following 
entailment patterns in the examples (adapted from Parsons 1990): 
 
(26) A delegate walked into the park. →    A delegate was in the park. 
(27) A delegate is near the park.   →    A delegate is near the park. 
 
In (26), the sentence A delegate… entails that the relevant delegate was in the park 
as a consequence of this event of motion. In (27), the sentence A delegate… entails 
itself, in the sense that it the delegate’s position is not an explicit consequence of 
some previous event of motion, but also holds for possibly more specific states 
(e.g., the delegate being currently near the park). The symbol ‘→’ represents the 
entailment relation between the two pairs of sentences. 
 The intuition behind these patterns is simple: adpositions, as they mirror 
relations between VRSs in language, also denote equivalent relations between 
DRSs and the events included in these DRSs. They do so by explicitly stating how 
events are ordered one another, thus explicitly representing the causal/temporal 
structure of (parts of) a sentence, possibly restricting this relation to certain 
events (e.g., those being “in” the park). I shall thus translate into as the complex 
DRS [{e,s,x,y}:e<s,s:in’(x,y)] and near as the complex DRS [{e,s,x,y}:e≤s,e: 
near’(x,y)]. The DRSs represent in a compact manner the Parsonian entailments, 
as part-of relations between the events denoted by the merged sentences. Inform-
ally, if a delegate walked into the park, he was in the park as a consequence. If a 
delegate is near the park, he may have arrived there because of some other 
events, or may stay there for some unspecified interval of time. 
 The interpretation of (24), at the relevant step and abstracting away from 
tense, is the following: 
 
(28) t. [{e,x}:delegate’(x),e:walk’(x) ]+[{e,s,y}: e<s,s:in’(x,y),park’(y)]= 
  t+1. [{e,s,x,y}:delegate’(x),e:walk’(x),e<s,s:in’(x,y),park’(y)] 
 
In words, (28) says that a delegate walked and, as a consequence of this event of 
walking, he ended up in the park. The interpretation of (23) would be similar, 
except that the contribution of “near” would yield the following (slightly 
informal) DRS: [{e,s,x,y}:delegate’(x),s:be’(x),s≤s’,s:near’(x,y),park’(y)].  
 This treatment of English adpositions is by no means exhaustive and 
would probably need revisions, especially once we take in account a broader 
cross-linguistic perspective and the well-known interplay of adpositions and 
verbs of motion (again, see e.g. Talmy 1978, 2000, Svenonius 2006, Higginbotham 
2009, and Zwarts 2010 for discussion). However, it allows us to represent in a 
rather simple what kind of contribution adpositions (and nouns) offer to a sen-
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tence, as well as introducing a rather compact theory of linguistic representation, 
in the guise of DRT. I shall thus collect all the crucial aspects of DRT and present 
them as parts of DRT’s underlying logic.  
 DRT can be treated as a logic of language, which can be represented as the 
model L=<D,+,≤>. The set D of DRSs is in turn a set of triples, defined as 
d=<w,u,con>, and with d≤D holding for each d. The model (of discourse) defined 
by DRT is a lattice which has a structure entirely equivalent to that defined for 
vision.19 The ‘dynamic’ incarnation of this model is Ld=<I,D>, the duple formed 
by DRSs and intervals of time at which they are combined together, with I again 
being defined as I=<t,+>. 
 The mapping from this model of language to other models, most 
specifically our logic of vision, can be easily defined via the function g, which is 
usually known as the anchor function in DRT (Kamp et al. 2005: chap. 4, Maier 
2006: chap. 3 for discussion). This function is defined as an isomorphism map-
ping each linguistic information unit onto a non-linguistic unit, in this case a 
visual unit, i.e. g(d’)=v: In our case, it matches DRSs (linguistic information units) 
with VRSs (non-linguistic, visual information units).  
 Since it is an isomorphism, it maps at least one DRS onto one VRS, and at 
most one DRS onto one VRS. It preserves structure, so a mini-discourse like (22) 
can be seen as the description of a complex scenario, made of two connected, 
simpler scenarios. Formally, we have g(d’+k’)=g(d’)+g(k’), which in words says: 
The scenario corresponding to the mini-discourse in (22) corresponds to the 
scenario matched by the first sentence (a man is walking in the park) followed by 
the scenario matched by the second sentence (this man is whistling). Much like 
the function f, the function g can, but needs not to, find a VRS for each mapped 
term. In this regard, the function g can also be thought as representing a top-
down process, since it represents how we can consciously match a sentence (and 
its content) with an extra-linguistic scenario it refers to. 
 Now that both sides of the isomorphism are defined, we have a good 
understanding of how information flows from vision to language and from 
language to vision, and thus we are ready to tackle the problem of the vision–
language interface in an explicit way. However, before doing so, I shall offer an 
answer to the second research question, which is now within our reach. The 
answer is the following: 
 
A–2: Our models of spatial vision and language must include any possible property and 
relation that can ‘connect’ two entities; these models can (must) be treated via a 
model-theoretic approach. 
 
Spatial vision and language, then, can be seen as two systems representing 
different aspects of the same underlying phenomena: How we build up and 
maintain complex ‘maps’ of the objects we keep track of, over discourse. At this 
point, we can explore the common space generated by these two structures, and 
                                                       
    19 In DRT or similar approaches (e.g., Krifka 1998), events and referents are part of (structural-
ly) different structures; here I follow Link (1983, 1998) and assume one common type of 
structure for all types of object. 
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thus focus on the vision–language interface. 
 
 
4. A Theory of the Vision–Language Interface, and Beyond 
 
In this section I shall offer a logical theory of the vision–language interface based 
on the results of the previous section (section 4.1); I shall offer empirical evidence 
in support of this approach (section 4.2); and sketch some broad consequences of 
my approach with respect to theories of the language faculty (section 4.3). 
 
4.1. The Vision–Language Interface: A Formal Approach 
 
A theory of the vision–language interface, given the discussion so far, must be a 
theory about the two-way information flow between two structures which repre-
sent (external) spatial information in a principled and highly organized way, the 
logical space defined by the logic of vision and language. As section 3 constituted 
a relatively long analysis of how these notions emerge from the basic bits of 
vision and language, I shall re-state my basic assumptions first and then dive into 
the vision–language interface problem. 
 I have assumed that both vision and language can be represented via a pre-
cise logic, which I called the logic of vision and the logic of language, respectively 
— or Visual Representation Theory (VRT) and Discourse Representation Theory 
(DRT), equivalently. These logical calculi share the same underlying structure: 
VRT is defined as triple S=<V,+,≤> and DRT as the triple L=<D,+,≤>. These mo-
dels are lattices, partially ordered sets, which minimally differ in having different 
types of elements, rather than in their structure. 
 The basic elements in these domains are respectively VRSs and DRSs: for 
each VRS v, the relation v≤V holds; for each DRS d, the relation d≤D holds. For 
each VRS v, the following identity holds: v=<e,o,pr>, i.e. each VRS is a triple of an 
event, an object and a property that identifies an object in an event. For each DRS 
d, the following identity holds: d=<w,u,con>, i.e. each DRS is a triple of a world/ 
event, a referent and a condition that identifies a referent in a world/event. 
While VRSs are discrete units (possibly) representing perceptual stimuli from the 
visual apparatus, via transduction, DRSs may be seen as discrete units represent-
ing other types of information units (e.g., ‘concepts’ or ‘thoughts’). They may be 
connected to VRSs via a slightly different type of transduction, but do not have a 
direct ‘external’ grounding: They represent purely ‘internal’ information. 
 While the two structures have different elements, their operations and re-
lations are basically the same. A syntactic operation, merge (ultimately, set union), 
allows to define each element as the sum of other elements, possibly only itself. 
We represent it as ‘+’. Its definition is simple: It is a binary operation taking two 
inputs of the same type (e.g., DRSs: a+b), yielding an output of the same type as 
the inputs (a DRS: a+b=c). It is associative, commutative, and idempotent: It allows to 
combine the same elements in different ways (associativity: (a+b)+c=a+(b+c)), 
regardless of their order of occurrence (commutativity: a+b=b+a), and can be 
‘repeated’ on the same input (idempotence: a+a=a).   
 A semantic relation, the accessibility/part-of relation (represented as ‘≤’), 
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integrates this syntactic operation and establishes how the results of the merge 
operation are ‘connected’. It is binary, as it establishes a relation between two 
objects of the same type (e.g., VRSs: a≤b, and it is reflexive, asymmetric and 
transitive: It allows us to establish that objects are part of themselves (i.e. a≤a), 
that objects can be identified (i.e. if a≤b and b≤a, then a=b), and that multiple 
relations can be compressed as a single relation (i.e. if a≤b and b≤c, then a≤c). 
 The merge operation and the part-of relation are connected via the following 
properties, which I shall again represent via set-theoretic notation. If a≤b, then 
a∪b=b and a∩b=a. In words, if one object is part of another, then their merging 
will correspond with the ‘bigger’ object (union), and their product will corres-
pond to the ‘smaller’ object (intersection). Semantic relations can be seen as the 
result of previous instances of syntactic operations, in a sense recording the suc-
cessful merge of two objects into a more complex, novel object. The structures 
defined by these operations are complex Lattices, i.e. partially ordered sets with a 
syntax and a corresponding semantics, and thus models of the phenomena they 
represent.  
 Although other operations can be defined (e.g., set intersection standing for 
attention), this ‘minimal’ logic allows us to aptly model how information units 
are processed and integrated together into more complex units, in a bottom-up 
way. They also allow us to define how one logic can be tightly connected to 
another via two functions, f and g, which respectively define an isomorphic map-
ping from VRSs to DRSs and from DRSs to VRSs. These functions are isomorphic 
because they map at least one input and at most one input to the same output, i.e. 
they are respectively injective and surjective, thus they are bijective.  
 The function f is defined as: f:v→d, i.e. a function that maps each visual 
structure v≤V onto a discourse structure d≤D, whereas the function g is defined 
as: g:d→v, i.e. a function that maps each discourse structure d≤D onto a visual 
structure v≤V. Note, now, that these two functions are one the inverse of the 
other: Their composition (represented via the symbol ‘◦’) will yield the identity 
function, e.g., we have f◦g=i, with ‘i’ being the identity function. This latter pro-
perty tells us that, for example, each noun may act as the linguistic label for a vi-
sual object, and thus that each visual object may a have noun as a linguistic label.  
 These isomorphisms allow us to explicitly represent how we ‘translate’ one 
type of objects into another, while for logical operators (i.e. merge and the part-of 
relation), they offer evidence that these operations are the same across models/ 
logical systems. The reason is simple: while objects define non-logical constants, 
merge and the part-of relation define logical constants, elements of a logic that 
receive the same interpretation on any model, whether it represents vision or 
language. In words, merge is interpreted as the union of two objects, whether 
these sets stand for visual structures or discourse structures, and so is the part-of 
relation interpreted as a relation between objects.  
 This is explicitly represented via a structure-preserving condition on our 
isomorphisms: f(a+b)=a’+b’, given that f(a)=a’ and f(b)=b’. In words, the noun for 
the object corresponding to the merge of the object “legs” and “surface” (table) 
corresponds to the super-ordinate noun that stands for the objects “legs” and 
“surface”. The merge symbol is the same on both sides of the identity, while the 
merged objects are different. The same holds for the part-of relation, since, if we 
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have a≤b, we have f(a)≤f(b). In words, if a leg is part of a table, then the noun/ 
concept leg is part of the noun/concept table. The same considerations hold, 
mutatis mutandis, for the function g. In words, vision and language may differ as 
models representing different ‘things’, but they are equivalent as models sharing 
the same structure. 
 The definition of these two isomorphisms has one important consequence: 
It allows us to outline a simple and yet very precise theory of the vision–
language interface. The main assumption I shall make is that the vision–language 
interface is defined as a Galois connection between these two structures. A Galois 
connection is defined as follows: given two lattices <A,≤> and <B,≤>, f(a)≤b if and 
only if a≤g(b). In our case, and with some notational fantasy, given the lattices 
<D,≤> and <V,≤>, we have g(d’)≤v if and only if d’≤f(v). In words, if vision and 
language are connected via a Galois connection, then the VRS corresponding to a 
DRS is part of a larger VRS, and a DRS corresponding to a VRS is part of a larger 
DRS. In words, vision and language representations are connected if each lingu-
istic term is matched by a visual entity, which is part of a ‘larger’ scenario, and if 
each linguistic term expressing a visual object is part of a sentence. Informally, a 
Galois connection is a method of defining an isomorphism between structures in 
which weaker relations can also be defined: it allows us to express not only that 
structures ‘look the same’, but also to compare the relation between many ele-
ments of one structure to an element of the other structure (e.g., Ganter & Wille 
1998: chap. 1). 
 The strength of this proposal is that it allows us to define a degree of 
accuracy by which a certain sentence describes a state of affairs and vice versa. For 
instance, an adposition matches a spatial representation when the two following 
conditions hold: f(v)=d’ and g(d’)=v. In words, if a book is supported by the top 
vertical surface of a computer, then the adposition on top of is quite ideal match 
for this scenario, since we intuitively have f(on-top)=on-top’, but also g(on-
top’)=on-top.  
 While identity cases are in a sense trivial, cases of partial matches allow us 
to grasp the crucial strength of the proposal. For instance, an adposition 
expressing only support of the book by the computer is intuitively less accurate 
(i.e. on) than on top of, which expresses the specific surface offering this support. 
This because it will represent only a part of the spatial representation in which 
book and computer are involved: if g(on’)=on and on≤on-top, then we will have 
g(on’)≤on-top to hold. In words, on represents only a part of a certain extra-
linguistic scenario, and thus will be less accurate than on top of. Conversely, the 
relation on’≤f(on-top) also holds, i.e. on is less accurate than the adposition which 
would perfectly match the said scenario. Hence, the part-of relation, when it is 
defined on ‘mixed’ objects by means of a Galois connection, can be interpreted as 
relation expressing a degree of accuracy of a sentence, an adposition or any part 
of speech, with respect to the extra-linguistic context.  
 This proposal on the vision–language interface makes two main predic-
tions. First, it predicts that the ‘amount’ of spatial (visual) information expressed 
by a sentence is flexible, and may be as accurate as the corresponding visual sce-
nario, but also that the same scenario can be described by adpositions of different 
‘accuracy’. Second, it predicts that, since the ‘binding’ between the two layers of 
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information may go in both directions, there is no ‘causal’ relation between these 
different computations, so one type of information is processed independently of 
the other. We are quite able to evaluate whether what we see refers to (or 
matches with) what we say and vice versa, but both mental processes need not a 
constant, unconscious feedback between the two levels of comprehension to 
occur. In words, we can say a lot about ‘where’ things are (including, but not 
limited to, geometric relations), but need not to limit ourselves to what we see.  
 A formal treatment of this ‘parallel’ processing can be represented as 
follows:  
 
(29) I V    VD   D 
 t. (a+b)         (a’+b’) 
 t+1.  (a+b)=g(a’+b’)  f(a+b)=a’+b’ 
 t+2.  (a+b)=g(a’+b’)  f(a+b)=a’+b’ 
 
In words, at some interval in a computation, the two types of information are 
first mapped onto the other domain, and then (dynamically) bound together if 
the two ‘flows’ of the process yield the same result, possibly compared in terms 
of accuracy in a common logical space, which is represented as ‘VD’. Inform-
ally, we check if what we see matches with what we say and vice versa, hence 
obtaining a ‘broader’ picture of facts. Since what we see needs not to match with 
what we say, the binding relation between these two types of information is 
entirely optional and, as we have discussed so far, it ultimately represents a top-
down translation process, which can be more or less accurate. 
 One important thing to note is that this formal treatment is modular also 
because the binding of two types of information is explicitly represented as a dis-
tinct result of a matching operation. If we would have assumed that the binding 
occurs by the simple co-synchronous occurrence of these operations, our archi-
tecture would actually have been connectionist, in nature. While the two processes 
are isomorphic and can be tightly connected, they are nevertheless two distinct 
processes, and a third process is their matching relation (i.e. binding); see Marcus 
(2001) for discussion. Now that we have gone through the formal details and 
their predictions, we can focus on their empirical support, which I shall analyze 
in the next section. 
 
4.2. Testing the Theory against the Data 
 
The theory I have proposed in the previous section is consistent with general as-
sumptions about vision and language as parts of a cognitive and modular archi-
tecture (cf. e.g. Jackendoff 1997, 2002), and possibly offers a more fine-grained 
and formally precision analysis and representation of these modules and their 
processes. In this section I shall explain more in detail why this theory is consis-
tent with previous proposals and offer an ‘improved’ model of their insights, and 
why it is consistent with general assumptions about cognitive architecture, i.e. 
why the two main predictions I offered in the previous section hold. I shall focus 
on four topics, offering evidence that confirms these predictions.  
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 A first topic pertains to the ‘amount’ of space found in language. Let me re-
peat (13) and (14) as (30) and (31) to illustrate the point: 
 
(30) The book is on the tip of the left edge of the blue table. 
(31) The book is on the table. 
 
The crucial difference between (30) and (31) is that both sentences may be used to 
convey information about the same extra-linguistic scenario, but (31) is definitely 
more accurate than (30). Vision-wise, a scenario in which the book is supported 
by the tip (of the edge) of the table is also a scenario in which a book is supported 
by the table — hence, the relation on≤on-top holds. language-wise, the DRS repre-
senting (31) is part of the DRS representing (28), so the relation on’≤on-top’ 
holds. Hence, the following identities g(on-tip’)=on-top and g(on’)=on hold, as 
well as on-tip’=f(on-top) and on’=(on). We can then observe that the relation 
g(on’)≤on-top holds, i.e. that (31) is a partial representation of the same scenario 
that (30) is a total representation of, and thus a less accurate description of facts. 
Conversely, the relation on’≤f(on-top) holds, i.e. (31) expresses part of the infor-
mation expressed by (30), and thus of the scenario that (30) represents.  
 A second topic pertains to the different degree of accuracy that two sen-
tences can have in describing a certain scenario, when involving different adpo-
sitions. If the meaning of two adpositions overlaps or stands in an entailment 
relation, then speakers may favor one over another, when they need to associate 
it to visual information. The entailment cases are quite intuitive, and can be seen 
as a general case of the relation between (30) and (31). In a situation in which a 
book is supported by the upper part of a drawer, on top of may be judged as a 
‘perfect’ adposition to describe this situation while on, that is entailed by on top of, 
may be considered as less appropriate, with respect to the scenario it purports to 
match with. 
 The cases in which adpositions overlap in meaning require some more dis-
cussion. Let me repeat (10) and (11) as (32) and (33) to illustrate the point: 
 
(32) The painting is on the wall. 
(33) The painting is in the wall. 
 
In a scenario in which a panting is literally encased in the wall, (33) may be a 
more accurate sentence to describe this scenario than (32), because it may express 
in a more precise way the matching extra-linguistic scenario. Intuitively, if a 
painting is in the wall, it is certainly supported by it, and actually part of the 
wall’s surface, rather than just adjacent to it (as for on). Formally, we can say that 
in is more accurate than on with respect to the aforementioned scenario if the 
following holds: if in’≤on’, then on’∩in’=in’, i.e. in is a part of on and its meaning; 
and thus, if g(on’)≤g(in’), then g(on’)∩g(in’)=g(in’), i.e. in describes a more specific 
scenario than on, and is hence considered more accurate. 
 The treatments I discussed in the first and second topic are consistent with 
results like those of Coventry & Garrod (2004), Regier et al. (2005), and much of 
the aforementioned literature on spatial sentence processing, which also cover 
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the relations between e.g., above and on, in and under, and so on. It is also consist-
ent with Levinson & Meira’s (2003) cross-linguistic results, which are indeed 
based on how adpositions can be conceptually organised in terms of increasing 
accuracy and specificity of their use in (implicit) context.20 This literature also 
offers indirect evidence of the validity of my proposal: Most experiments aim to 
test how participants consciously match visual stimuli with linguistic stimuli, 
evaluating how accurate sentences can be in describing a scenario. Hence, it indi-
rectly supports the view that the functions f and g represent conscious processes. 
 A third topic pertains to a complex case, that of the relation between vision 
and language with respect to reference systems and their computation. Again, 
works like Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin (1994), Carlson (1999), or Regier et al. 
(2005) show that, when speakers interpret axial terms such as to the left of, their 
accuracy can be measured with respect to different reference frames, e.g., 
whether a chair is to the left of a table with respect to the observer (relative 
frame), the chair itself (intrinsic frame), or an environmental cue like the floor 
(absolute frame). What I have suggested for ‘standard’ adpositions can be 
extended to these ‘axial’ adpositions as well, with no need to make any further 
assumptions. Furthermore, although some proposals conjecture that the ‘cogni-
tive’ procedures by which ‘absolute’ spatial relations are computed dramatically 
differ from other visual procedures (e.g. Levinson 2003), their mapping onto 
linguistic unit seems to be rather ‘ordinary’. Whether we may compute a polar 
direction such as the one corresponding to North via an entirely different set of 
cognitive resources than the ones involved in e.g., computing the support re-
lation corresponding to on, the two adpositions share the same underlying gram-
mar, and seem not to reflect this ‘cognitive difference’, if it exists. 
 From these three topics we can observe that the first prediction of my novel 
interface approach, the flexibility of this interface, is substantially borne out. This 
allows to make a further general comment regarding the “how much space” 
problem, and how we may choose the degree of accuracy we want to express. 
The literature gives us the relevant answer regarding how this process comes 
about, in the guise of theories of sentence planning and production. For instance, 
in a theory of sentence-planning (speaking) like Levelt (1989), speakers are as-
sumed to decide, at a pre-linguistic level, both which basic ‘facts’ and the re-
lations between these facts they wish to convey (Levelt’s level of macro-planning), 
and consequently which language-specific rules (syntactic and semantic alike) to 
use in order to convey these facts (Levelt’s level of micro-planning).  
 For our discussion macro-planning represents the relevant aspect of pro-
duction, since it indirectly defines “how much” we may express about extra-
linguistic information. In slightly more formal terms, macro-planning may be 
treated in the following way. A speaker may look at a certain general visual 
context V and may decide to express part of this scenario via the selection of a 
certain VRS v. Given a selection function s, this process can be represented as, for 
                                                       
    20 A conjecture is that classical results of prototype theory (e.g. Rosch 1975) may actually find a 
formally precise account, if we, for example, pursue the intuition that a noun such as robin 
may be seen as the perfect linguistic label for the sum of all visual/cognitive information we 
ascribe to birds, rather than penguin. This intuition is actually pursued in Ganter & Wille 
(1998) and especially in van Eijck & Zwarts (2004) in thorough detail. 
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example, s(V)=v. For instance, a speaker may look around a room and may de-
cide to say that a certain specific book is on the tip of the left edge of the blue 
table. The selected VRS v would actually stand for the complex VRSs represent-
ing book, blue table, edges, and tips, and the relations holding between these 
VRSs.  
 The sentence corresponding to this VRS, which we can represent as f(v)=S’ 
and thus as f(s(V))=S’, indirectly represents which pre-linguistic facts are chosen 
by the speaker as finding their way into language. The amount of space finding 
its way into language roughly corresponds to the speaker’s intentions to be more 
or less accurate in describing a scenario and his eventual desire to express one 
outstanding aspect over another. Although he may do so via different micro-
plans, i.e. via the choice of different words and sentence, this choice is inherently 
flexible, rather than dictated by constraints on what type of spatial information 
finds its way in language. This is captured by the function f taking the function s 
as its input. Informally, we may decide to say something about the scene we are 
paying attention to and, in doing so, we selectively (and consciously) pick out 
visual information about this scene, then ‘convert’ it into the corresponding 
sentence, thus effectively deciding how much ‘space’ gets into language. 
 A fourth topic pertains to the relation between vision and language in case 
of cognitive impairment in one of the two modules. The intuition is the follow-
ing: If my theory can predict how the vision–language interface works, it should 
also make predictions about the problems that could arise when these modules 
are not properly interfaced — it should be breakdown-compatible (e.g. Grodzinsky 
1990). The following examples suggest that this is indeed the case. 
 A well-known fact is that people affected by Williams syndrome may have 
relatively intact language skills, including a good understanding of spatial lang-
uage, but are usually unable to assess even basic spatial relations from a visual 
perspective. These patients may be able to understand an adposition such as in 
front of, but may not be able to evaluate what is the front of an object (e.g. Landau 
& Hoffman 2005 and references therein). 
 An obvious account, in the current proposal, is that, since spatial vision is 
quite impaired, it will not be possible to have a visual input that will correspond 
to a linguistic output. That is to say, the function f(v) will be undefined, since it 
will have no input, and so the function g(d’) will be undefined as well. As a con-
sequence, it may not be possible for individuals with Williams syndrome (to give 
one example) to relate what they see to what they say. As it stands, my proposal 
seems to be consistent not only with a general modular approach to cognition, 
but also with a general approach to cognition and its disorders.  
 Another well-known case of a cognitive disorder affecting one side of the 
‘space’ interface is aphasia. In Broca’s aphasia, omission of prepositions (among 
other functional words) is well attested, while spatial vision is usually (complete-
ly) spared. Adposition omission in aphasia may be gradual and patients tend to 
omit more general adpositions (e.g. at) rather than less general adpositions (e.g. 
in front of; see e.g. Trofimova 2009 for a recent review). Regardless of their degree 
of language impairment, aphasics usually lose their ability to produce but usu-
ally not their ability to comprehend adpositions, and, more generally, language; 
hence, they are able to understand whether adpositions correctly describe a scen-
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ario or not. While one aspect of spatial language can be dramatically impaired 
(e.g. production), all other aspects of both spatial vision and language, including 
their interface, are substantially spared, in line with my assumptions. 
 A similar account may be extended to another cognitive disorder, that of 
dyslexia.21 Models like the Dual Route Cascaded model of reading aloud (DRC; e.g. 
Coltheart et al. 2001 but also Beaton 2004), the processing of (‘reading’) a single 
word is assumed to occur via three parallel processes, one in which we visually 
recognize a written word (non-lexical route), and one in which we (may) retrieve 
its lexical entry as well as its phonological and syntactc-semantic properties 
(lexical/sub-lexical route). Although one process can be faster than the other, full 
recognition of a word occurs when both processes converge to the same output, 
but fails if the ‘visual’ process is damaged (failure to read graphemes and words, 
or shallow dyslexia) or the ‘linguistic’ process is damaged (failure to understand 
the meaning of words, or deep dyslexia). 
 As per the other cognitive disorders, our theory of the vision–language 
interface is consistent with this analysis of dyslexia without any further assump-
tions. Although for dyslexia we would certainly need a more accurate and 
specific analysis of both sides of the problem, the intuition seems to be correct: 
We may not be able to see certain visual objects correctly, but we may still 
retrieve their corresponding linguistic labels, and vice versa. We can also observe 
that the second prediction is borne out, since these cognitive disorders show that 
spatial computations can occur both at the visual and linguistic level and can be 
bound together, but also that this binding process is not necessary. In fact, even if 
one side of this process may be completely impaired, the other side will be still 
able to work independently. 
 Summing up, the discussion of these four topics suggests that our vision–
language interface theory can have theoretical value and can withstand empirical 
scrutiny, even once we look beyond the topic of space. As we have seen, visual 
and linguistic representations can be matched in a quite precise way, but the 
processes regulating this matching of information is inherently conscious, that is, 
based on a speaker’s top-down thought processes. Speakers may wish to be more 
or less accurate in describing a scenario and may evaluate sentences with respect 
to their descriptive accuracy. They may be able to understand spatial language 
even if they can’t navigate the environment and, for complex tasks such as 
reading (i.e. the codified matching of visual and linguistic stimuli), they require 
conscious and protracted effort to establish the proper mappings, provided that 
this mapping is not impaired by cognitive deficits.  
 These facts are somehow hard to explain in previous accounts of the 
vision–language interface but fall out as predictions of the theory I have sketched 
so far due to its flexibility. This theory also presents in detail the convergences 
between space, vision, and language, offering a view in which these two modules 
are remarkably similar; as such, it may appear that there is little or no difference 
between the two modules, both from a structural and a content-bound point of 
                                                       
    21 Dyslexia can be informally defined as a cognitive disorder which influences our ability to 
successfully read, i.e. to either successfully decode the sequence of graphemes (‘letters’) 
making up a written word, or to properly interpret a word, and access syntactic information 
about it. See Beaton (2004) for a thorough introduction. 
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view. I shall focus on these differences in the next section.  
 
4.3. What Is Unique to Language, and Why 
 
The discussion I have offered so far has sketched the strong similarities between 
vision and language as modules of cognition. It has also offered an attempt to 
explain how these two modules exchange information — for instance, via the 
synchronization of their processes. (Spatial) vision and language seem to be 
remarkably similar modules, and it is not surprising that in some quarters they 
are considered as contiguous modules, if not the same module, in some respect 
(e.g. Talmy 2000, Coventry & Garrod 2004). 
 There are, however, a number of properties of language which seem rather 
hard to reduce to general, non-linguistic features, and which inherently involve 
the possibility in language to convey information about ‘unbounded’ quantities. 
In the common parlance of biolinguistic research, much of our discussion up to 
this point has focused on defining the properties that can be ascribed to the broad 
faculty of language (FLB), in the terminology of Hauser et al. (2002), since I have 
mostly been concerned with the relation between vision and language, and with 
those properties that are shared by both computational systems. In this section, I 
shall sketch a very preliminary proposal, stemming from the discussion offered 
so far, on what properties are unique to language and thus may be possible 
candidates to form the kernel of the faculty of language in the narrow sense 
(FLN). I shall do so by focusing, for the most part, on spatial language. I shall 
discuss these properties in a less formally rigorous way, focusing on speculative 
aspects of the discussion. 
 Look at the examples: 
 
(34) Mario has gone to the store three times. 
(35) Mario may go to the store. 
(36) All the boys have gone towards the store. 
(37) Every boy will go toward the fence. 
(38) A boy may come to the party. 
(39) Some boy may come to the party. 
(40) Mario always goes to the store. 
(41) Mario seldom goes to the store. 
(42) Where are you going? 
(43) I am going there, too. 
(44) Mario lends a book to Luigi. 
(45) Luigi borrows a book from Mario. 
 
In (34), Mario’s going to the store is described as occurring three times or 
instances, but little is said about when this happens: It may occur one time right 
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now, one time yesterday, and one time when he was a young lad. Two of the 
events that the adverb denotes cannot be mapped onto visual inputs, because 
two of them cannot correspond to current facts, but rather to ‘memory traces’ we 
have recorded of them. Language allows us to merge together pieces of infor-
mation which do not necessarily correspond to one modality, into a unified type 
of information. 
 In (35), Mario’s possible event of going to the store is something that we 
conceive as occurring in, say, a few more minutes, or whenever he feels like it, 
perhaps tomorrow. In the case of the non-current events of (34), the modal auxili-
ary may simply denote a linguistic unit which hardly can find a visual unit as its 
counterpart. In (36) and (37), the amount of boys that have gone to the store may 
vary, and may involve pairs or triples (or bigger quantities), but each of these 
possible combinations of boys will go to the store, without any exceptions. 
 In (38) and (39), instead, we may not know the identity of who is going to 
come to the party, except that it is likely to be a single boy, someone who we may 
have not mentioned so far and may never come to know, let alone see. These 
cases may already show that the mapping from vision to language can be quite 
partial (i.e. not always defined), but the following cases should give even 
stronger evidence. Adverbs such as always and seldom, as in (40) and (41), suggest 
that we may even convey linguistic information about several (infinite) situations 
(sets of events) in which Mario goes to the store, or say that such situations are 
rare but do occur (i.e. seldom).  
 Examples like (42) and (43) show that we may actually rely on someone 
else’s ability to access information in order to retrieve information of Mario’s 
whereabouts: If someone answers our question, we will be able to know Mario’s 
location without actually seeing this location, and if someone has already told us 
where Mario is going, we may say that we are going there, although we may not 
be able to see “where” “there” is. In (44) and (45), the same set of events is pres-
ented under two different, and in a sense complementary, perspectives: While 
the visual scenario is in a sense the same (a book is temporarily exchanged, bet-
ween Mario and Luigi), the two sentences express these facts from Mario or Lu-
igi’s perspective, respectively. 
 There are two generalizations that we can make from these examples. One 
is that language may convey information which can be multi-modal, in the sense 
that linguistic units may bring and represent together information which comes 
from different cognitive sources, and may have no extra-linguistic instantiation 
whatsoever. This is not surprising if we look at language at a module that only 
processes internal information, stripped of any perceptual or modal-specific as-
pects (unlike vision), but it is also consistent with various theories of memory as 
a ‘mental’ model in which we record and organize memory. 
 One way to look at this aspect is the following, and it is based on theories 
of memory like Cowan’s (1988, 1995, 2005). In this theory, long-term memory is 
seen as the model representing all the information we may have stored about the 
world, whether it is veridical or not (i.e. whether it is represented in episodic me-
mory or not22). Short-term memory, on the other hand, can be seen as the current 
                                                       
    22 Episodic memory is a component of memory which ‘records’ perceptual information regard-
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part of long-term memory which is accessed and evaluated at a given time. In our 
logic, long-term memory can be seen as a static model <D> or <V>, while short-
term memory can be seen as the dynamic counterparts of these models, <I,D> or 
<I,V>. 
 For instance, we may have observed Mario going to the store in three very 
different moments of our life, but if we use a sentence like (32), we represent 
these otherwise separate events of time in the same representation (ultimately, a 
DRS) in our short-term memory. Language allows us to define a ‘common space’ 
in which ‘displaced’ events form a may form a consistent representation insofar 
as they share the same formal properties (e.g., being three instances of a walking 
event), and thus are stripped of any constraints on perceptual information — but 
may also be bound with other ‘portions’ of short-term memory (e.g., visual com-
putations; cf. the previous section). Informally, an adverb like three times says that 
there are three contiguous intervals in a derivation in which three events of going 
to the station become logically contiguous, i.e. we have a+b+c at an interval t+n. 
 Another generalization is that language can express relations and quanti-
ties which are not necessarily finite (or bounded), and is not limited to offering 
one perspective. This latter, (quite) rough, intuition is based on our last pair of 
examples, but several other similar examples could be made; think of any active 
sentence and its passive counterpart, for instance. If we think in slightly more 
formal terms, we may construe (42) as representing a scenario in which Mario’s 
actions as an ‘agent’ operates onto Luigi as a ‘patient’, and can be schematically 
represented as a→p. We can then assume that (43) can be represented as the 
inverse type of relation, which can be represented as also ¬(a→p). In very inform-
al words, we can represent that the sequence of events expressed by (43) flows in 
the opposite direction of (42), as the informal use of negation aims to represent, 
although we express the order of relevant entities in the same way as in (42).  
 This is possible because in language we can express the same underlying 
conceptual structures under different ‘perspectives’, but via virtually the same 
logical apparatus (cf. also Landman 1991: chap. 3 and 2004: chap. 7–8). Again, if 
we think of language as defining a conceptual ‘space’ not constrained by percep-
tual limits, then the same underlying information can be expressed in two appar-
ently opposite ways, which, however, underlie the same logical principles (e.g., 
monotonicity). Although (42) and (43) describe the same extra-linguistic event, 
their interpretations represent two possible ways by which language can struc-
ture this information. 
 Another form of ‘unboundedness’, its linguistic realization as well, is ulti-
mately represented by the interpretation of quantifiers and other ‘expressions of 
quantity’, as the examples show. Informally, in language we can express infor-
mation about numbers of individuals which are far greater than the amount of 
individuals we can ‘see’ and which can be structured in rather complex and fine-
grained ways, as adverbs like seldom and always suggest.  
 This can be illustrated via a detailed analysis of (34) and (35). Note here 
that I shall depart quite dramatically from DRT and treat a quantifier like every as 
represented by a logical operator rather than a duplex condition. In both senten-
                                                       
ing the first time we observe a given event.  
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ces, it is possible to represent the contribution of all and every to the sentence in 
terms of the universal quantifier, which I shall here represent in its Boolean 
incarnation, ‘∧’ (e.g., Montague 1973, Keenan & Faltz 1985). This symbol can be 
informally interpreted as a form of unbounded coordination: Informally, the sen-
tence Every boy has gone to the store can be interpreted as the equivalent of “Mario 
has gone towards the store and Luigi has gone to the store and…”, i.e. as if we 
were to state each possible boy in a large, perhaps infinite, domain of discourse, 
one by one. 
 Suppose then that we take the set of boys as a list (sequence) of boys in 
discourse. The DRS representing all the boys is equivalent to the merging of the 
DRS representing the sum of the last boy with the sequence of boys occurring 
before him in this infinite list. We define the interpretation of a universally quan-
tified noun phrase (its DRS) via the sum of the interpretation of its parts, via 
induction (its constituting DRSs).  
 This can be represented as: 
 
(46) t.   [{x–2}:boy’(x–2)]+[{x–1}:boy’(x–1)]= 
 t+n.   [{x–2,x–1}:boy’(x–2),boy’(x–1)]= 
 t+n+1. [∧x:boy’(x)] 
 
With the referent/individual (x–2) representing the list of boys preceding the last 
boy (i.e. the second-to last (complex) referent), (x–1) representing the last boy, 
and ∧x representing the ‘new’ referent obtained from the merging of the two 
‘old’ referents. This is a recursive, inductive definition of the universal quantifier, 
in terms of an unbounded form of merge, and its interpretation. In words, we 
interpret the universal quantifier as the result of taking each referent in discourse 
via one common condition. This result is another DRS, the DRS representing the 
result of taking each referent which can be identified as a “boy” one by one, i.e. 
via the product of each condition merged in a DRS, here represented as ‘∧’.  
 These considerations can be also extended to other quantifiers with the 
proper provisos, but also to adpositions, thus suggesting that spatial language is 
also ‘unbounded’ in its interpretive range. For instance, the relational component 
of any adposition (e.g. near) can be recursively defined as the merging of two 
opportune relations. Abstracting away from the specific condition on proximity 
(i.e. near’) and with some notational fantasy, “near” can be represented as: 
 
(47) [{s,s’}:s≤s’]=[{s,s’–2}:s≤(s’–2)]+[{s,s–1}:s≤(s’–1)] 
 
Here the ‘geometry’ approach to adpositions is quite useful to illustrate the intui-
tive meaning of (47). If a figure is the ground when it occupies a certain region, 
then it will be near the ground if it occupies any region which is included in the 
bigger region. Conversely, once we sum all the (sub)-regions in which a figure is 
near a ground, then we will obtain the ‘general’ region which can be labeled as 
near.  
 This way of representing the universal quantifier, and in general of repre-
senting quantified noun phrases, as well as the interpretation of near and other 
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adpositions, is informally based on one recursive function, the Fibonacci series, 
which allows to define one object (e.g., a natural number) as the sum of its direct 
predecessors. Intuitively, it may be extended to all of the other functional words I 
have discussed in examples (34)–(45), and to any expression that captures a form 
of quantification. 
 Several authors have argued that the Fibonacci series can represent how 
recursion is expressed in language (e.g. Soschen 2008 and references therein), but 
one may also assume that the successor function may be a recursive function that 
can also be used to represent the recursive nature of syntactic processes (see 
Landman 1991: chap. 1 for discussion). The crucial aspect is that, since language 
is different from vision by being fully recursive at a syntactic level, it will also be 
different in having terms which directly express the result (interpretation) of this 
unboundedness, and thus will be fully recursive at the semantic level. 
 An indirect way of capturing this difference is by enriching our logic repre-
senting language, so that we have the tuple L=<D,+,≤,∧>. This tuple represents 
the ‘structure’ of language as including not only a minimal syntax (merge, ‘+’) and 
semantics (the part-of relation, ‘≤’), but also a set of operators, here represented by 
the universal quantifier, that denote the result of linguistic processes. We have an 
indirect reconstruction of the distinction between FLN and FLB.  
 This reconstruction is indirect only because recursion is a resulting 
property of the ‘logic of language’, but it nevertheless represents one (maybe the) 
element of distinction between vision and language. Informally, it tells us that 
language has certain recursive closure principles which allow to label not only ob-
jects from other models (e.g. nouns for objects), but also to express the processes 
by which we collect together these objects into abstract structures. Adpositions 
represent one case, and quantifiers represent a more language-specific case, but 
the same reasoning could be applied to any functional word in language. We are 
able to talk about, for example, all the past boys and apples because we are able to 
compute a referent that stands for the combination of two different sets of entities 
(i.e. boys and apples), possibly representing entities ‘displaced’ in time and space 
— even if these sets may include an infinite amount of ‘smaller’ referents (i.e. 
each single boy and apple).  
 It is also indirect because, as we have seen, visual and linguistic infor-
mation are processed as distinct types of information, although they are potenti-
ally connected up to isomorphism. While there can be an intimate relation bet-
ween what we see and what we say, language is not bound by other modules of 
cognition in its expressive power, although the entities that make up the universe 
of discourse denoted by language must be the result of previous processes of 
interpretation, as the closure principle entails. 
 One important aspect, however, is again that vision can be represented via 
a similar, although less ‘powerful’, logical structure: As observed in Pinker & 
Jackendoff (2005) and Jackendoff & Pinker (2005), a number of ‘structural’ or 
hierarchical properties are domain-general, and thus not unique to language, 
because they represent domain-general logical principles by which we process, 
retain, and organize different types of information. Vision represents here one 
important case, but the phonological component of language also offers a similar 
case, and other examples abound (e.g., the ‘grammar of action’ analyzed by Fujita 
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2009, the ‘grammar of music’ in Jackendoff & Lerdahl 2006, or the ‘grammar of 
phonetics’ of Reiss 2007). 
 The intuition behind these considerations is the following. Each module of 
cognition that is properly definable can be represented via the same underlying 
logic, which I have presented here in two slightly different ‘incarnations’. The 
structures defined by this logic are models of the ‘things’ they represent, for 
instance visual objects. These models can be infinite, since they can potentially 
represent, for example, the infinity of objects we can recognize, events we can 
witness, and so on. The models defined by each module can be mapped onto a 
‘common’ logical space, that of language: We can talk about what we see, smell, 
think, believe, etc. 
 This very informal discussion can be made more precise via the discussion 
of a well-known theorem of model-theoretic semantics, the Löwenheim–Skolem 
theorem. This theorem can be very roughly paraphrased in the following way: If a 
first-order logic has infinite models, then it is a corresponding countable infinite 
model. In our case, its import can be seen as follows. We may define several logi-
cal systems, each of them representing a single module of cognition. Each logic 
has the same underlying (and thus domain-general) syntactic and semantic prin-
ciples. Each logic can define an infinite model: We may be able to recognize an 
infinity of (moving) objects, an infinity of sounds, realize an infinite of possible 
actions, and so on. Defined in this way, each logic/module appears to be an 
independent system, an internal model that potentially allows to represent how 
we can interact with the external world, but needs not to rely on ‘external’ inputs 
for these computations. 
 The Löwenheim–Skolem theorem tells us that even if we have an infinity of 
such logical systems, it is possible to define a more general logic which includes 
all of these modules in a ‘common’ logical space. More precisely, the downward 
part of the theorem tells us that, if a model is (countably) infinite, then this model 
may include an infinity of possible sub-models, themselves infinite. The upward 
part of the theorem tells us that for each (infinite) sub-model, we can find an 
extension of this model that includes the sub-model and some other elementary 
statements. So, if our ‘main’ model represents language, it will include models of 
other modules as proper sub-models (downward part); if a module such as 
vision can be represented via a model, then this model can be integrated inside 
the main model of language (upward part). 
 The conceptual import of this theorem can be dynamically interpreted as 
follows. We can assume that, for each (well-formed) visual computation, we can 
have a matching VRS in our model of vision. Each visual information unit can 
then be mapped onto the language model, and thus be part of a general model 
that includes other types of information (upward part). Conversely, for each ling-
uistic unit so defined, a corresponding non-linguistic unit can be found, so that 
from the general model, we can move to the more specific model (downward 
part). This process can unravel over time: for each thing we see, we may have a 
corresponding noun, which we then associate to any object that has that shape, to 
put it in a very informal way. The same principle of closure can be defined for 
adpositions (and verbs): For each type of spatio-temporal relation between 
objects we ‘see’, we may have a corresponding adposition, which we associate to 
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any relation that has that spatio-temporal structure, or ‘shape’. 
 Both model (language) and sub-model (vision) will thus be expanded or 
updated over time, but the underlying (Boolean) structure representing these 
processes and their results will retain the same basic structure, as this update 
process will be guided by the same basic principles. Informally, these models can 
become quite ‘rich’ over time, but the basic structural principles by which their 
growth occurs remain the same, as a consequence of their recursive definition. In 
this regard, (full) recursion represents the possibility for the language to appar-
ently expand ad infinitum, representing any type of information in a common 
space. Similarly, the relation between the language model and its sub-models, 
which takes the shape of interface relations/conditions, represents the possibility 
that language (recursively) emerges as a ‘general’ model, generated by the projec-
tion of all models of cognition into a ‘neutral’ logical space.23 
 I shall thus propose the following answer to the third research question: 
 
A–3: The nature of the vision–language interface is that of a bijection; recursive closure 
principles and interface conditions define what is unique to language. 
 
What distinguishes language from other modules of cognition is not the type of 
underlying structure, but two properties emerging from this structure and its 
ability to represent other structures in common space, (full) recursion and inter-
face conditions. The answer I offered so far is virtually the same offered by 
Hauser et al. (2002), although the argument on which I have based my answer is 
relatively different, and perhaps places a greater emphasis on the interaction 
between recursion and interface conditions and their inherent ‘logicality’, as the 
kernel properties of FLN. This answer is also consistent with the considerations 
made by Pinker & Jackendoff (2005) and similarly-minded contributions to the 
FLN/FLB debate, since it suggests that language and other modules of cognition 
are quite more similar than it may appear at first glance.  
 The answer I offered so far might also offer an insight with respect to one 
important Biolinguistic problem, the emergence of language from an 
evolutionary perspective. I tentatively suggest the following way to look at this 
problem, assuming in advance that what I shall say in this paragraph is nothing 
more than a wild (and perhaps wrong) conjecture. If we take a logical perspective 
and compress the evolutionary millennia into a conceptual space, then the 
emergence of a FLN kernel, from an evolutionary perspective, occurs when the 
integration of different types of information into a common format emerges. 
 Pushing this speculative line to its logical limit, we might assume that at 
some point, roughly 200,000 years ago, our ancestors were (suddenly?) able to 
compare what they saw with what they said, and vice versa. From this initial step, 
which could be called the first step of induction, we might as well as assume that 
the n+1th subsequent steps followed suit over the next few hundred of thousand 
years, taking shape as the unraveling of the gamut of languages we can currently 
                                                       
    23 This assumption leaves open the problem of ‘how many’ models make up our cognitive 
architecture that are integrated in this model. I leave open this question, but I assume that 
we can leave out the ‘massive modularity’ hypothesis typical of some evolutionary psycho-
logy literature. See Fodor (1998, 2000) for further discussion, however.  
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attest in the world (see e.g. Piattelli-Palmarini & Uriagereka 2005 for discussion 
and some references). 
 This single and yet very powerful emergent property could have arisen as 
the possibility (perhaps, necessity) to integrate different bits of information into 
an internally coherent (and perhaps optimal) representational/computational 
system. It might have been the case that language arose as the ‘proof’ that it is 
possible for different cognitive processes/modules to combine together into a 
unified, coherent cognitive architecture; thus it emerged entirely because of inter-
nal, structural pressures (Buzśaki 2006), although it became one tool (out of 
many) for humans to grasp and represent facts about the world, including the 
position of the things we see around us.  
 I shall leave these complex topics aside, and focus my attention back to our 
much more modest topic of discussion. Given the discussion I offered so far, I 
shall propose the following answer to the global research question: 
 
Q-A: The relation between spatial vision and spatial language is an isomorphism, as both 
models represent the same ‘amount’ of information via different types of infor-
mation. 
 
This answer sums up the results of this section. Note that, while in this section I 
have suggested that language, broadly defined, describes a model which includes 
a model of vision as one of its proper parts, if we focus on spatial language, then 
this portion of language has the same structure and properties of vision; 
consequently, it (correctly) appears that vision and language are more similar 
than it seems, as observed in much literature. Much more could be said about 
this topic, as the discussion I have offered in this section can only be thought as a 
very preliminary attempt at refining a notion of FLN (and FLB, for that matter) 
and its emergence, from the point of view of ‘space’. For the moment, though, I 
shall leave this discussion aside, and move to the conclusions. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have offered a novel proposal regarding the relation between 
vision and language with respect to ‘space’ — our understanding of things and 
their place in the world. I have argued that our spatial vision and language are 
quite abstract in nature, as they involve the processing of various types of infor-
mation and their ability to individuate objects and the events they are involved in 
as well as the ‘structural’ relations that emerge from this process of individu-
ation. 
 In doing so, I have offered a number of innovations on several closely 
related topics, including an updated review of the debate, a model-theoretic 
approach to vision which covers data usually ignored in the debate on ‘space’ 
(via the VRT proposal), a novel DRT treatment of adpositions, and a novel 
analysis of the vision–language interface, and what consequences this analysis 
has for a general theory of the language faculty. 
 The general picture I offered is one in which different models of cognitive 
Space and the Vision–Language Interface 
 
215 
processes can be formally defined in detail, and then embedded into a more 
general model of ‘knowledge’, modeled via a particular approach to Fodor’s 
(1975) notion of ‘language of thought’, DRT, and the ‘modularity of mind’ hypo-
thesis (Fodor 1983), although taken from a definitely more logical stance (as in 
e.g. Crain & Khlentzos 2008, 2009). Informally, language represents a ‘neutral’ 
logical space, a model of knowledge representation in which different concepts 
can be freely combined together, since they are already stripped of their ‘external’ 
constraints when they are represented in the corresponding models (e.g., Asher 
& Pustejovsky 2004, Asher 2011, and references therein). A similar reasoning 
holds for the articulatory-perceptual side of language. While we need to organize 
speech streams, say, into coherent units, the result of this process must then be 
organized into a coherent structure of syllables, words, and utterances which 
may be organized according to processes and relations not unlike those of other 
modules, and which are then mapped onto concepts, and thus lose their 
‘external’ part. See Reiss (2007), Hale & Reiss (2008), and Samuels (2009) for 
discussion. 
 In this regard, language is the model that comes into being when all other 
‘sub-models’ expressed by other modules of cognition are joined in a common 
logical space, and which might have emerged as the ‘projection’ of different 
cognitive modules into this common logical space. With respect to this neutral 
logical space, then, spatial language represents that fragment of space which 
represents spatial vision, i.e. our abstract representation of things in the world, 
whether this representation is veridical or not. As a consequence, the proposals I 
have made here, although still very preliminary in their nature, can be seen as 
offering a better picture not only on what is the nature of spatial representations 
in vision and language, but also on the logic behind the processes by which we 
combine together these representations, and what this tells us about the general 
architecture of mind and language. 
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